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Substantive Due Process Analysis and
the Lockean Liberal Tradition:
Rethinking the Modern Privacy Cases
JEFFREY S. KOEHLINGER*
The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when
it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the Constitution .... There should
be, therefore, great resistance to expand the substantive reach of those
Clauses, particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights
deemed to be fundamental.'
The fourteenth amendment provides that no state shall "deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." 2 Originally,
this clause ensured that every citizen received certain minimal procedural
guarantees before his or her rights would be limited or taken away. In later
decisions, however, the Supreme Court recognized a substantive element to
the due process clause. 3 This substantive due process analysis is "the judicial
practice of constitutionalizing values that cannot fairly be inferred from the
constitutional text, the structure of government ordained by the Constitu-
tion, or historical materials clarifying otherwise vague constitutional provi-
sions." 4 This nonoriginais review enjoyed its greatest popularity in Eisenstadt
v. Baird and Roe v. Wade,6 where the Supreme Court recognized the right
of the individual to use contraceptives and the limited privacy right of a
woman to an abortion. However, Justice White's pronouncement in Bowers
v. Hardwick raises considerable doubt regarding the validity of substantive
* J.D. Candidate, 1990, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; A.B., 1987,
Hillsdale College.
1. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1986).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall ... be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... ").
3. See, e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977); Muger v.
Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887).
4. Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on *(and Beyond) Recent Cases,
71 Nw. U.L. REv. 417, 419 (1976) ("Prescriptively, substantive due process refers to the
principle that a law adversely affecting an individual's life, liberty, or property is invalid, even
though offending no specific constitutional prohibition, unless the law serves a legitimate
governmental objective."); see also C. WoLFE, THE RisE OF MODERN JUDICIAL Rvmw 145
(1986) ("The doctrine of substantive due process is so called because the inquiry focuses not
on the legal procedure by which one is convicted and punished ... for violating the law, but
rather on the law itself and whether a person may legitimately be required to obey such a
law.").
5. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
6. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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due process in the modern privacy cases. 7 In addition, the Court's recent
decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services' suggests that a majority
of the Court may no longer support the limited privacy right of a woman
to an abortion on the grounds originally articulated in the Roe decision.9
Because there is considerable agreement that the Supreme Court has failed
to articulate a principled approach to its substantive due process decisions, 0
the crucial issue is whether the Court can continue to examine governmental
regulation of privacy interests under substantive due process analysis, or
whether such analysis is an illegitimate and "lifeless" doctrine that should
be abandoned altogether." This Note contends that the Court can continue
to legitimately decide privacy cases like Griswold v. Connecticut,12 Roe and
Bowers, but only if it follows a moral philosophy approach to substantive
due process analysis in the privacy area that is firmly rooted in the Lockean
liberal tradition.' 3
Modern substantive due process analysis and the privacy rights it pur-
portedly protects reflect a liberal tradition whose backbone is a natural
rights philosophy most persuasively articulated by John Locke. The essential
purpose of the Lockean liberal tradition is to ensure that civil society and
7. According to one commentator, Bowers signals, if not the "second death" of substantive
due process, at.least an undermining of the doctrinal integrity and legitimacy of Supreme
Court decisionmaking in the substantive due process area. See Conkle, The Second Death of
Substantive Due Process, 62 IND. L.J. 215, 216, 241 (1987); see also Rubenfield, The Right
of Privacy, 102 HAiv. L. Rav. 737, 739 (1989) ("Hardwick has exposed deep flaws in the
prevailing jurisprudence and ideology of privacy. The constitutional ground has shifted; perhaps
it is dissolving altogether.").
8. 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989).
9. See id. at 3067 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
10. "The Court has been unable to conclude whether privacy analysis is based on textual,
consensus, traditional, or autonomy interests. No expressed theory offers even an approximate
explanation of the various decisions, and the Court has apparently given up the attempt."
Nichol, Children of Distant Fathers: Sketching an Ethos of Constitutional Liberty, 1985 Wis.
L. REv. 1305, 1306. Another commentator has charged:
The liberty established by The Abortion Cases has no foundation in the Consti-
tution of the United States. It was established by an act of raw judicial power.
Its establishment was illegitimate and unprincipled, the imposition of the personal
beliefs of seven justices on the men and women of fifty states. The continuation
of the liberty is a continuing affront to constitutional government in this country.
J. NOONAN, A PRIVATE CHoIcE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN THE SEvNTMS 189 (1979); see also
R. SMrrH, LIBERALISM AND AMERIcAN CoNsnTo OINAL LAW 239 (1985) ("The current Court's
reliance on its judgments of traditionally fundamental forms of privacy to decide which claims
merit strict scrutiny is inarguably unpredictable.").
11. See Conkle, supra note 7, at 216.
12. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
13. The moral philosophy approach to nonoriginalist review is by no means new or radical.
Essentially it "would permit the Supreme Court to seek out and apply political-moral principles
that properly ought to control the relationship between government and individual .... Mhe
Court is simply to engage in a process of reasoning that draws on considerations of political
and moral philosophy." Conkle, supra note 7, at 230 (footnote omitted). For a fuller
examination of this and other forms of nonoriginalist review, see G. STONE, L. SEmMAN, C.
SuNsTEN & M. TuStNET, CONsTuTioNAL LAW 862-64 (1986); Conkle, supra note 7, at 230-
37.
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political institutions protect and promote, as far as is practicable, the
"rational liberty" of the individual. 14 This rational liberty can be described
as the ability of each person to "reflect for himself on his circumstances
and decide on the course that will best aid in achieving both his continued
self-guidance and his distinctive happiness." 1 5 The Lockean liberal tradition,
with its emphasis on fostering the rational liberty of the individual, offers
a much more principled and organized method for determining the sub-
stantive content of an individual's "life, liberty, and property" rights under
the due process clauses than that currently utilized by the Supreme Court.
Thus, substantive due process analysis that draws upon this Lockean liberal
tradition can provide a proper benchmark for judging the correctness of
the Court's modern privacy decisions, as well as a principled basis for
deciding future cases. 16
Although the Court's decision in Griswold reached a result consistent
with the fundamental principles of the Lockean liberal tradition, the Court
failed to follow a proper Lockean approach in Roe and Bowers. This Note
argues that rethinking Roe and Bowers under a Lockean moral philosophy
approach to substantive due process produces defensible outcomes contrary
to those reached by the Court. Part I summarizes the main tenets of the
Lockean philosophical tradition that are most relevant to a defensible
approach to substantive due process analysis in the privacy area. It also
more fully explores the concept of rational liberty and its general implica-
tions for this analysis. As background for analyzing the modern privacy
cases, Part II briefly demonstrates how these Lockean principles found their
way into American constitutional theory at the Founding. Part III asserts
that these principles provided the primary theoretical underpinnings for the
Court's first major attempt at substantive due process analysis during the
Lochner era, where the Court identified an individual's right to contract as
a "liberty" interest protected by the due process clause of the fourteeenth
amendment. Finally, Part IV demonstrates the consistency of the Court's
result in Griswold with the Lockean moral philosophy approach and pos-
tulates the proper outcomes for Roe and Bowers.
I. T1m LocKcEAN LIBERAL TRADITION 17
To fully comprehend the Lockean philosophical tradition, one must first
understand Locke's description of the law of nature and his picture of the
14. R. Smsrr, supra note 10, at 5.
15. Id. at 216.
16. There have been numerous other attempts to articulate a rationale that harmonizes the
Supreme Court's modem privacy decisions. See, e.g., Craven, Personhood: The Right to be
Let Alone, 1976 Dum L.J. 699; Feinberg, Autonomy, Sovereignty and Privacy: Moral Ideals
in the Constitution?, 58 NoTRE DA L. REv. 445 (1983); Karst, The Freedom of Intimate
Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980); Rubenfeld, supra note 7.
17. "Locke has long been considered the political theorist who exerted the greatest influence
1990]
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individual in the state of nature and in civil or political society. Although
Locke wrote a number of philosophical works, the following discussion draws
almost exclusively from Locke's Two Treatises of Government" because this
work is the classic example of the Lockean liberal tradition. 9 A firm grasp
of Locke's thought is important because it forms the backdrop against which
past privacy decisions must be evaluated and new cases decided.
In general, the Lockean view of the law of nature is nearly identical to
the view handed down through the classical liberal tradition. 20 Locke writes,
"I will not dispute now whether Princes are exempt from the Laws of their
Countrey, but this I am sure, they owe subjection to the Laws of God and
Nature. No Body, no Power can exempt them from the Obligations of that
Eternal Law." ' 2' For Locke, the law of nature is a natural and moral
standard to which every individual must conform his actions both in the
state of nature and in civil or political society. 22 This view of the law of
nature is important because it becomes the source of both the inalienable
rights of the individual, as well as the social duties that accompany these
rights. 2
Depicting the law of nature as a standard to which individuals must
conform, Locke identifies those natural laws which are to govern the conduct
of mankind. The first and foremost fundamental law is the preservation of
mankind. 24 As a natural corollary to this law and nearly equal in importance
is the second law of nature, that of the preservation of each individual.-5
Locke writes: "Every one as he is bound to preserve himself, and not to
quit his Station wilfully; so by the like reason, when his own Preservation
upon our natural rights heritage. His stature in this respect has been virtually unquestioned."
G. MACE, LOCKE, HOBBES, AND THE FEDERALIST PAPERS: AN ESSAY ON TH GENESIS OF THE
AMERICAN POLITICAL HERITAGE 9 (1934).
18. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1963) (3d-ed. 1698).
19. But see R. ASHCRAFrT, REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS AND LOCICE'S Two Treatises 9 (1986)
(Because Locke's Two Treatises must be read within their historical context, one cannot claim
that they represent anything more than a political manifesto in defense of the radical movement
of the 1670s and 1680s of which Locke was a part.); see alsb G.J.A. PococK, VIRTUE,
COMMERCE, AND HISTORY (1985).
20. See Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law, 42
HARv. L. REv. 149, 168 (1928-29) ("Upon the observed uniformities of the human lot, classical
antiquity erected the conception of a law of nature discoverable by human reason when
uninfluenced by passion, and forming the ultimate source and explanation of the excellencies
of positive law.").
21. J. LOCKE, supra note 18, bk. II, § 195.
22. See J. GOUGH, JOHN LOCKE'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: EIor STUDIES 25-26 (1950).
23. For a description of what "commands form part of the law of nature" for Locke, see
Von Leyden, John Locke and Natural Law, in G. SCHOCHET, LIFE, LIBERTY, AND PROPERTY:
ESSAYS ON LOCKE'S POLITICAL IDEAS 16-17, 22 (1971). See also infra notes 39-43 and accom-
panying text.
24. See J. LOCKE, supra note 18, bk. II, § 135.
25. See id. bk. II, § 16 ("by the Fundamental Law of Nature, Man being to be preserved,
as much as possible, when all [of nature] cannot be preserv'd" (emphasis in original)).
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comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to preserve the
rest of Mankind... "2 And "[t]he State of Nature has a Law of Nature
to govern it, which obliges every one: And Reason, which is that Law,
teaches all Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty,
or Possessions." 27
The final basis for Locke's natural rights philosophy is his view of the
state of nature, which he describes as a state of complete freedom in which
individuals
order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as
they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature, without ...
depending upon the Will of any other Man. A State also of Equality,
wherein all the Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more
than another.2
But Locke does not stop there; instead, he emphasizes that freedom and
equality are still subject to the laws of nature and that a man is free to do
as he wishes as long as his actions do not endanger his life or the life of
another.29
According to Locke, an individual's natural rights result from the obli-
gations that arise in the state of nature to preserve oneself and mankind:
"This Freedom from Absolute, Arbitrary Power, is so necessary to, and
closely joyned with a Man's Preservation, that he cannot part with it, but
by what forfeits his Preservation and Life together." 30 Locke writes that
because man is born "with a Title to perfect Freedom, and an uncontrouled
enjoyment of all the Rights and Privileges of the Law of Nature, equally
with any other Man, or Number of Men in the World," he thus possesses
"a Power ... to preserve his Property, that is, his Life, Liberty and Estate,
against the Injuries and Attempts of other Men . . .,,"
For the purposes of a Lockean moral philosophy approach to substantive
due process analysis, the right to "liberty" is most important. According
to Locke, liberty is essentially a "power." He writes in his Essay Concerning
Human Understanding that "so far as a man has power to think or not to
think, to move or not to move, according to the preference or direction of
his own mind, so far is a man free."'32 Hence, for Locke:
26. Id. bk. II, § 6 (emphasis in original).
27. Id. (emphasis in original).
28. Id. bk. II, § 4 (emphasis in original); see, e.g., J. COLMAN, JoHN LoCE's MORAL
Pon.osopHiy 178 (1983); J. DuN, THE POLITICA THOUGaHT OF JOHN LocrE 106 (1969); J.
GOUGH, supra note 22, at 21.
29. J. LOCKE, supra note 18, bk. II, § 6; see also id. bk. II, § 4 (men may order their
actions and possessions "within the bounds of the Law of Nature").
30. Id. bk. II, § 23 (emphasis in original).
31. Id. bk. II, § 87; see also id. bk. II, §§ 6, 123.
32. J. LocKE, AN EssAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (A.C. Fraser ed. 1959) (1st
ed. 1690) bk. II, ch. 21, § 8 (emphasis in original).
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[T]his capacity for rational self-determination is the distinctive feature
of human nature and also the essential element of moral responsibil-
ity. ....
.. . [L]iberty is essential to human happiness as both an end and a
means. It is essential in itself, because without it we feel so uneasy that
life becomes miserable, and it is a means, since with it we progress
toward all our goods. It is also a defining characteristic of our humanity,
an exercise of the capacity that sets us above animals, and the part of
our human nature that enables us to act in accordance with the deter-
minations of our reason."
Thus, under the Lockean conception of liberty, an individual is free only
when he is able fully to exercise his rational faculties: The individual must
accurately perceive and understand himself and the world around him; he
must also be able to deliberate upon the choices presented by that experience
and select and follow the chosen courses to the fullest extent possible.
This understanding of Lockean liberty has been identified by Rogers
Smith as the "rational liberty view" of political philosophy.34 According to
Smith, the primary concern of the rational liberty view is
for individuals to improve their condition by increasing their understand-
ing of their own social and personal situations, their capabilities and
inclinations, and their opportunities and limits.... [T]he central task
is for all to engage in the reflective deliberation that will instruct them
in how best to attain happiness while maintaining, if not improving, the
capacities that are inextricably linked with it for all who value a sense
of conscious self-determination. 3
Smith identifies two important aspects of this portrait of human character
and the moral basis of civil society that make it particularly appealing.
First, because "people derive a sense of their moral obligations ... from
the social relations and moral rules prevalent in their communities" and
"find satisfaction and feel free only by adopting a course of life that
includes considerable immersion in the activities of some of these constitutive
social forms[,] "36 the rational liberty view has broad and lasting appeal:
Locke's conception of the moral man not as a mere pawn of powerful
forces but as a being capable of self-understanding and of reasonable
choice naturally supports conceptions of happiness and morality as things
that can and must be attained in collaboration with the processes of
nature and the pursuits of our fellow rational beings. 31
33. R. SmrIH, supra note 10, at 29; see also R. Asi=airT, LocscE's Two TREATISEs oF
GOVERNMENT 102 (1987) ("Locke assumes that individuals possess the freedom to order their
actions, because 'that freedom [is] the foundation of all the rest' of the moral actions they
execute in the state of nature." (citation omitted)).
34. See R. SmrnH, supra note 10, at 5.
35. Id. at 214.
36. Id. at 206-07.
37. Id. at 207.
[Vol. 65:723
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Second, Smith contends that despite the rational liberty view's emphasis on
an individual's rational faculties, it is not an intellectually elitist view by
any means because "the appropriate moral models ... are not great
intellects per se but rather people of exceptional self-understanding and wise
self-direction." 38
Although Locke is lauded for his defense of fundamental individual
rights, he is less well-known for his insistence on the corresponding duties
to society which accompany those rights. The first of these duties consists
of observing the first two laws of nature: A man must preserve himself
and, when his own preservation is not at stake, his neighbor and mankind
in general. 39 Following this duty are several others. First, man has a duty
to preserve society. 40 Second, and as a corollary to the first, each individual
is obliged to regulate his actions so that those activities will not hinder the
ability of others to exercise their rational liberty (i.e., reflection, rational
deliberation, and self-direction).41 Third, as a derivative of the duty of each
individual to preserve mankind comes the general proscription against killing
in any form except for preservation's sake.42 Finally, in Locke's discussion
of conjugal society and parental power, there emerges a natural law duty
on the part of parents to care for their children until they reach the age of
reason.
43
The amount of protection that these natural rights will receive when man
enters into civil society" depends upon the ultimate purpose of that civil
society. Initially, Locke emphasizes that the individual in civil society is
obliged to follow the will of the majority. However, because the primary
38. Id. at 214.
39. J. LocKE, supra note 18, bk. II, § 6; see also J. TULLY, A DiscouRsE oN PROPERTY:
Joiw LocKE An His AnvEs~Ams 45 (1980) ("This [first and fundamental law of nature] is
translated into an individual duty to preserve oneself, and to preserve others when one's own
preservation is not in question."); Reck, Natural Law in American Revolutionary Thought,
30 REv. MErTPxysics 686, 695 (1976-77).
40. Locke writes that "the first and fundamental natural Law, which is to govern even
the Legislature it self, is the preservation of the Society, and ... of every person in it." J.
LocK-E, supra note 18, bk. II, § 134 (emphasis in original). "Society" for Locke differs from
"mankind" in that society includes only those "agreeing with other Men to joyn and unite
into a Community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in
a secure Enjoyment of their Properties, and a greater Security against any that are not of it."
Id. bk. II, § 95; see also id. bk. II, § 87; J. Tuu.y, supra note 39, at 48-49.
41. R. Smrru, supra note 10, at 217, 218.
42. See, e.g., J. LocKE, supra note 18, bk. I, §§ 39, 56, 92, bk. II, § 6; see also J. TULLY,
supra note 39, at 118 ("Killing animals, therefore, is only justified if it is a necessary and
obliquely intended consequence of the intended act of making use of the animal for support
.... "); infra notes 228-30 and accompanying text.
43. J. LocKE, supra note 18, bk. II, § 56 (parents have "an obligation to preserve, nourish,
and educate the Children, they had begotten" (emphasis in original)); see infra notes 161-63,
239-40 and accompanying text.
44. Locke defines civil society as "the consent of any number of Freemen capable of a
majority to unite and incorporate into such a Society." J. LocKiE, supra note 18, bk. II, §
99.
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purpose of civil society is the better protection of an individual's life, liberty
and property, 45 Locke is quick to limit society's power over the individual
to certain specific spheres. 46 Under the Lockean liberal tradition, the fun-
damental rights of the individual become identical to the interests of civil
society because the majority in society would never take action arbitrarily
or unnecessarily to limit these rights. 47 Viewed in this light, the Lockean
liberal tradition achieves "a firm and provocative formulation of the natural
law philosophy in behalf of natural rights, with emphasis on the right to
private property, on limited, constitutional government based on consent
•.. in order to secure [the] lives, liberties, and estates [of the people]. ''48
Locke's formulation of an individual's fundamental rights and corre-
sponding duties is important for analysis of the modern privacy cases because
it renders Locke's account of an individual's natural rights a limited one.
Unlike the Hobbesian individual, the Lockean individual is not free merely
to preserve himself alone;49 rather, the Lockean individual must also concern
himself with those around him. While exercising his capacities for rational
deliberation and self-direction, the Lockean individual must also ensure that
his course of action does not unduly restrict or interfere with the capacity
for rational liberty in others. This linking of individual liberty to the
preservation of society, coupled with Locke's repeated emphasis on the
interests of society (a primary interest being to foster the rational liberty of
45. See, e.g., J. GOUGH, supra note 22, at 38 ("[Locke] equated the public good with the
preservation of the property (i.e. the lives, liberties and estates) of individuals."); R. Sum,
supra note 10, at 213 (The rational liberty view authorizes the liberal political community to
rightfully prohibit only those actions that endanger persons' continuing capacities for rational
deliberation.); Aaron, Authority and the Rights of Individuals, in G. ScHocHET, supra note
23, at 167 ("The state is made for the individual, and not the individual for the state.");
Corwin, supra note 20, at 389 ("[L]egislative supremacy is supremacy within the law, not a
power above the law."); Von Leyden, supra note 23, at 15 ("[P]olitical power for Locke is
justified only in so far as it preserves men's natural rights, especially those of life and
property.").
46. See, e.g., Aaron, supra note 45, at 167.
47. To emphasize this point, Locke lays out several limits on the legislative power that
governs society: It cannot be arbitrary over the lives or fortunes of the people; it must rule
by standing, promulgated laws; it cannot take a man's property without his consent; it cannot
levy taxes without the consent of the people; and it cannot transfer the legislative power to
other hands. See J. LoCKE, supra note 18, bk. II, §§ 135-42.
48. Reck, supra note 39, at 694. From the standpoint of rational liberty, "political
institutions should, through democratic processes, elicit and enforce prevailing social standards
of what consititutes minimally rational, deliberative conduct and of what preserves the ability
to engage in it." R. SMrrH, supra note 10, at 213.
49. Hobbes writes:
The RIGHT OF NATURE, which Writers commonly call Jus Naturale, is the
Liberty each man hath, to use his own power, as he will himselfe, for the
preservation of his own Nature; that is to say, of his own Life; and consequently,
of doing any thing, which in his own Judgement, and Reason, hee shall conceive
to be the aptest means thereunto.
T. HOBaES, LEV1KrAT 189 (C.B. Macpherson ed. 1968) (1651).
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the individual), are key pillars in the Lockean framework against which
modern assertions of fundamental privacy rights under the Constitution
must be judged. 0
II. THE LocKAN LIBERAL TRADITION AND THE FOUNDING"'
A Lockean moral philosophy approach to substantive due process analysis
is appropriate because the Lockean liberal tradition greatly influenced those
who wrote about and occupied prominent leadership positions during the
period of the American Founding.52 The colonists naturally subscribed to
the Lockean description of man's status in the state of nature and civil
society because the Lockean idea of a higher "natural law" had been a
part of American thinking since Europeans first settled on the continent.53
Like Locke, they accepted and articulated the classical natural law model
in which the state of nature was one of peace and not strife,5 4 in which the
laws of nature governed, 5 and in which men were by nature equal, free
50. As shall be demonstrated, this view requires that the Court first should scrutinize
carefully the fundamental nature of the privacy interest asserted to determine whether it truly
affects the individual's capacity for rational deliberation and self-direction. If the asserted
privacy interest does directly involve the individual's rational liberty, it should be classified as
"fundamental." Accordingly, any state regulation of that privacy interest must survive a form
of "strict scrutiny" review: The state must show that the capacity for rational deliberation
and self-direction in others is significantly restricted or inhibited by the unregulated exercise
of the asserted privacy interest.
If, however, the asserted privacy interest does not involve the individual's capacity for
rational liberty, it should not be classified as "fundamental." Any state regulation of that
privacy interest would be subject merely to a form of "rational basis" review: Although the
state could not arbitrarily prohibit that activity, any rational purpose for the regulation would
usually be sufficient. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
51. [I]t is in Locke's works that one finds the true integration into one edifice, and
hence the full exploration of the meaning, of the three most important pillars
supporting the Founders' moral vision: Nature or "Nature's God"; property, or
the "pursuit of happiness"; and the dignity of the individual as rational human
being, parent, and citizen.
T. PANGLE, Tm SPmriT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM: Tan MORAL VISION OF rn AmERICAN
Foutim AND TH PumosopnY OF Loci.a 2 (1988).
52. As shall be demonstrated, the Lockean liberal tradition formed the theoretical frame-
work for the Revolutionary writings, including the Declaration of Independence and the
political theory of the Founding embodied in the Constitution. See, e.g., Corwin, supra note
20 (Lockean natural law forms the "higher law" background of American constitutional
theory); Reck, supra note 39, at 688-89 (Locke was one of the natural law theorists from
whom pre-revolutionary America drew heavily). But see G. MACE, supra note 17, at 10
(traditional views of the extent of Locke's influence are unjustified when his thought is
compared with that of the Declaration, Constitution, and Federalist Papers).
53. See C. ROSSrIER, SBEDTIME OF Tan REPUIouc 369 (1953).
54. Most colonists would agree with Locke that the state of nature was chiefly characterized
as "a State of Peace, Good Will, Mutual Assistance, and Preservation." J. LocK, supra note
18, bk. II, § 19; see, e.g., C. RossrrER, supra note 53, at 364.
55. Natural law in colonial America had four basic meanings: It was a set of moral
standards to guide private conduct; it was a system of abstract justice to which the laws of
men conformed; it was a line of demarcation around the proper sphere of political authority;
and it was a source of natural rights. C. RossrTER, supra note 53, at 368-69. It is with the
latter two of these meanings that this discussion is concerned.
1990]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
and thus entitled to and obliged to ensure mutual preservation. 6 Hence, it
is not surprising that for the colonists, as for Locke, a man's inalienable
rights were the rights to "life, liberty; property, conscience, and happi-
ness."
5 7
The most obvious and well-known source of inalienable Lockean rights
in American political theory during the Founding is the Declaration of
Independence. s First, the Declaration appeals to the right of any oppressed
people under the "Laws of Nature" to return to a state of nature and
construct anew a government which derives its powers from the "consent
of the governed.' ' 9 Second, it affirms that all men in a state of nature or
properly constituted civil society are "created equal" and are by implication
"free.'' 6 Finally, it enunciates the famous right to "Life, Liberty, and the
pursuit of Happiness," and the charge that governments are instituted in
order to "secure these rights." 61
By recognizing the right to "Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness"
the colonists, like Locke, acknowledged that "there is a law higher than
positive laws and actual political conduct, a supreme law by reference to
which the latter may be evaluated and rectified." 62 By "life," the colonists
meant a right to self-preservation, that right which, according to Locke,
was accorded to all by the laws of nature. By "liberty" they meant an
entitlement to inalienable rights, that is, "a right to the rights of life and
56. See id. at 374.
57. Id. at 377. Thus, as for Locke,
[t]he rights of man, that is to say, not only depended on or sprang from natural
law; they were natural law, at least so far as it could be understood by men. In
the political theory of the American Revolution natural law was all but swallowed
up in natural rights.
Id. at 375 (emphasis in original). Such sentiments found their way into countless writings of
the colonists in Revolutionary America. See, e.g., id. at 362-401.
58. See, e.g., Reck, supra note 39, at 692 ("Locke's principles and phrases pervade
American revolutionary writings; their presence in the Declaration of Independence has
subjected its author to the charge of plagiarism.").
59. Declaration of Independence para. 1 (U.S. 1776) [hereinafter "Declaration"].
60. Id.; see J. LocKE, supra note 18, bk. II, § 95 ("Men being ... by Nature, all free,
equal and independent, no one can be put out of this Estate, and subjected to the Political
Power of another, without his own Consent." (emphasis in original)).
61. Declaration, supra note 59, at para. 1. Similar rights are enunciated in many of the
state constitutions also ratified during this period. One particularly interesting statement occurs
in the Virginia Declaration of Rights:
That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain
inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot,
by any compact, deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life
and liberty, with the means of acquiring property, and pursuing and obtaining
happiness and safety.
Virginia Declaration of Rights, § 1 (June 12, 1776); see also Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights, art. I (March 2, 1780); N.H. CONST. art. I (October 31, 1783); Pennsylvania Declaration
of Rights, art. I (September 28, 1776); Vermont Declaration of Rights, art. I (July 8, 1777).
62. Reck, supra note 39, at 712.
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the pursuit of happiness. ' 63 The most peculiar of the three rights is that of
the "pursuit of Happiness." Although one could argue that the colonists
were merely referring to Locke's third primary right of property,6 it is
equally plausible that on a broader level the colonists were incorporating
Locke's concern for protecting the rational liberty of the individual. The
pursuit of happiness can be equated with the rational liberty view in that
the chief moral and political purpose of any civil society is the promotion
of the capacities of all for reflective self-determination. 65 Thus, the colonists
formulated in the words of the Declaration of Independence a Lockean
natural and inalienable rights philosophy that formed the basis of the
American political order."6
Locke's influence is pervasive in the Constitution as well. A close ex-
amination of the language, structure, and theoretical underpinnings behind
the Constitution and Bill of Rights reveals that for the Founders, the form
of government adopted could only be one whose chief aim was the pres-
ervation of these natural rights, which would, in turn, promote the general
welfare of the nation. 67 Thus, for the colonists, the Constitution was not a
source of rights, but rather, an enumeration of "a nucleus or core of a
much wider region of private rights, which, though not reduced to black
and white, are as fully entitled to the protection of government as if defined
in the minutest detail." 6s Once this cession of natural rights had occurred,
63. G. MAcE, supra note 17, at 8. The colonists also concluded, like Locke, that the
strongest basis for liberty would be found in a doctrine of inalienable rights, that is, rights
that a man could not consent away, nor another arbitrarily restrict. See Glenn, Abortion and
Inalienable Rights in Classical Liberalism, 20 Am. J. Jmus. 62, 80 (1975).
64. Rossiter argues that for the colonists, the pursuit of property was synonymous with
their happiness. Accordingly, the colonists chose such a phrasing chiefly because at that time,
they were experiencing unprecedented restrictions on their ability to dispose of their property.
See C. RossrrR, supra note 53, at 379.
65. See R. Smn , supra note 10, at 5.
66. This conclusion carries with it important consequences. As one author has noted: "The
Declaration asserts that this order is based on theoretical truths, about justice or right, not
merely on power. If inalienable rights are indefensible, then American politics is undercut at
its root." Glenn, supra note 63, at 63.
67. The preamble to the Constitution declares:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union,
establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves
and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States
of America.
U.S. CONST. preamble; see also C. RossrrER, supra note 53, at 411 ("The only purpose that
counted was that of the men who had instituted it: to seek protection for their 'personal
liberty, personal security, and private property."'); Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 CoLuM.
L. Rnv. 1410, 1412 (1974) ("[The Constitution] only places limits on the infringement of
private rights by government, both the rights specified and all others 'retained by the people."').
68. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L. Ray. 247,
248 (1914); see also id. at 247-48 ("These rights are not, in other words, fundamental because
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the Constitution became a "fundamental law" binding on all. 69
However, this supremacy did not give the new government freedom to
do as it pleased; rather, it could act only in certain limited areas that had
been specifically enumerated in the text of the document itself.70 Although
the Framers knew that "dependence on the people" would serve such an
end, they further ensured the restriction of governmental power by dividing
it between the state and federal government (federalism), and by then
dividing it among different branches at each level (separation of powers)."
This system of checks and balances heeded Madison's warning that
"[aimbition must be made to counteract ambition,''72 and reflected the
Lockean sentiment that government could legislate only for the good of
society, which consisted of the preservation of the individual's life, liberty
and property. 73
Consistent with this view, Hamilton argued that even in its original and
unamended form, "the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and
to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS. ' 74 Despite such safeguards,
the Constitution was amended in 1791 in an attempt to further delineate
they find mention in the written instrument; they find mention there because fundamental.");
TnE FEDERALIST No. 2, at 37 (J. Jay) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); Corwin, supra note 20, at 153
("[These rights] owe nothing to their recognition in the Constitution-such recognition was
necessary if the Constitution was to be regarded as complete."); Henkin, supra note 67, at
1412 ("The Constitution does not confer private rights; they are antecedent to and independent
of the Constitution.").
69. Article VI provides, "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art.
VI.
70. "[I]n relation to the extent of its powers ... the proposed government cannot be
deemed a national one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and
leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects." Tim
FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961); see also U.S. CONsT. amend.
IX ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people."); id. at amend. X ("The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the states respectively, or to the people.").
71. Madison writes:
In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people is
first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to
each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security
arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each
other, at the same time that each will be controlled by itself.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 323 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
72. Id. at 322.
73. See also TnE FEDERALIST No. 85, at 521 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (discussing
how the Constitution ensures "additional securities to republican government, to liberty, and
to property").
74. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 515 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). Arguing that
the two primary objects of a bill of rights were "to declare and specify the political privileges
of the citizens in the structure and administration of the government ... [and] to define
certain immunities and modes of proceeding which are relative to personal and private
concerns," Hamilton concludes that "[aldverting therefore to the substantial meaning of a bill
of rights, it is absurd to allege that it is not to be found in the work of the convention." Id.'
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those natural rights which were "retained by the people." Among other
rights,75 the Bill of Rights set out that thoroughly Lockean provision that
forms the basis of modern substantive due process analysis: "No person
shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law." 76 Thus, the structure of the Constitution and the subsequent addition
of the Bill of Rights emphasize the fundamentals of the Lockean liberal
tradition that pervade our constitutional order.
Because the Lockean liberal tradition underlies the Revolutionary writings
and political theory of the Founding embodied in the Constitution, it is
particularly appropriate to use a Lockean moral philosophy approach as
the proper guide to evaluating modern assertions of privacy rights. The
colonists relied heavily on the Lockean liberal tradition to identify the
substantive and procedural rights that formed the ideological basis of the
American Revolution and that constituted the primary objects of the federal
Constitution. In light of the Lockean liberal tradition's influence, any
modern court attempting to decide whether an asserted privacy right is a
liberty or property interest protected by the due process clauses should pay
particular attention to its dictates. As one commentator has noted: "What
is especially amazing about American political thought is not that it contin-
ues to employ the idiom and exhibit the mood of the Revolution, but that
both idiom and mood seem adequate to deal with many present-day prob-
lems."77
III. THE LocKEA LIBERAL TRADITON AND ECONOMIC
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PRO.Ss"
The Supreme Court implicitly followed a Lockean moral philosophy
approach during the Lochner 9 era when the Court first used substantive
75. The Bill of Rights protects the freedoms of speech, press, and religion, U.S. CONST.
amend. I, as well as the right to trial by jury, id. amend. VI, and protects against unreasonable
searches and seizures, id. amend. IV, double jeopardy prosecutions, id. amend. V, and cruel
and unusual punishments, id. amend. VIII.
76. Id. amend. V.
77. C. RossrrR, supra note 53, at 449. Professor Corwin has drawn a similar conclusion
with respect to the constitutional freedoms protected by the Court:
Locke, ... in cutting loose in great measure from the historical method of
reasoning, opened the way to the larger issues with which American constitutional
law has been called upon to grapple in its latest maturity. Without the Lockian
[sic] or some similar background, judicial review must have atrophied by 1890
in the very field where it is today most active ....
Corwin, supra note 20, at 393-94.
78. "The repudiation of Lochner by the success of the New Deal made manifest the
unmooring of non-interpretivist jurisprudence from its justification in natural law." Kenyatta,
From Lochner to Roe: Community Consciousness as Constitutional Context, 11 LEGAL STuD.
F. 29, 33 (1987).
79. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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due process analysis to strike down legislation that it regarded as unduly
restrictive of certain individual rights.8 0 Although the Court subsequently
abandoned the use of substantive due process as a vehicle for evaluating
the constitutional legitimacy of economic and social welfare legislation,8'
the period nevertheless illustrates that the Court utilized a Lockean approach
in examining the asserted economic liberties and countervailing societal
interests.
The rationale used in Lochner derives primarily, if not exclusively, from
three Lockean natural law concepts: the idea of rational liberty, the labor
theory of value and the limits on legislative authority. When considered
together, these three staples of the Lockean liberal tradition illustrate that
the Lochner Court attempted to justify in implicit Lockean terms its decision
to protect as fundamental the individual's "right to make a contract.'"'1
The theory of economic substantive due process developed gradually in
the period following the Civil War. As early as the 1870s, members of the
Supreme Court showed a willingness to limit legislative power concerning
social welfare legislation. 83 Ten years later in Mugler v. Kansas4 the Court
claimed the right to examine the "substance" of state legislation.3 The
Court laid the final groundwork in Allgeyer v. Louisiana,s6 where, for the
80. During the Lochner period, the Court used the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment to strike down state welfare legislation which "restricted economic liberty in a
way that was not reasonably related to a legitimate end." J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, CoNsTrroNAL LAW 343 (3d ed. 1986).
81. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Nebbia v. New York,
291 U.S. 502 (1934).
82. The economic liberties pressed before the Court during the Lochner era are significantly
different from those raised by the modem privacy cases. The liberty of employer and employee
to contract for the employee's labor raises issues completely different from the liberty of a
woman to have an abortion or of married couples to use contraceptives. Because the primary
focus of this Note is a resolution of the issues raised by the modem privacy cases, discussion
of whether the Court correctly decided Lochner under a Lockean moral philosophy approach
is beyond its scope. Lochner is important here, however, because it illustrates that the Court
implicitly recognized the propriety of attempting to resolve the relevant economic issues in
Lockean terms.
83. In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), the Court noted: "Undoubtedly, in mere
private contracts, relating to matters in which the public has no interests, what is reasonable
must be ascertained judicially." Id. at 134.
One of the dissenters, Justice Field, made a more sweeping summary of the liberty protected
by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment:
By the term "liberty," as used in the provision, something more is meant than
mere freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of prison. It means freedom
to go where one may choose, and to act in such manner, not inconsistent with
the equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his
happiness; that is, to pursue such callings and avocations as may be most suitable
to develop his capacities, and give them their highest enjoyment.
Id. at 142 (Field, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
84. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
85. Id. at 661.
86. 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
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first time, it struck down a state law on substantive due process grounds.17
The case is especially noteworthy for Justice Peckham's enunciation of a
liberty of contract that would eventually provide the backbone for economic
substantive due process. 8
The Court's most controversial decision involving economic substantive
due process and the decision most clearly evidencing the Lockean liberal
tradition is Lochner v. New York.8s Writing for a bare majority of the
Court, Justice Peckham overturned a statute because it was "an illegal
interference with the rights of all individuals, both employers and employ~s,
to make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they may think best,
or which they may agree upon with the other parties to such contracts."' 9
Following a Lockean moral philosophy approach, the Court examined both
the true nature of the right asserted by the individual and the interests
urged by the state to justify the restriction. In characterizing the rights of
the individual, the Court noted that "[tihe general right to make a contract
in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution." 9 The Court
also recognized that such a right was not unlimited but rather that it might
in some instances be limited by the state in order to preserve the "safety,
health, morals and general welfare of the public." 92
Having identified the rights and interests on each side, Peckham turned
to articulating a test by which the relative weight of each could be balanced.
87. The Court found the Louisiana law, which prohibited obtaining insurance on Louisiana
property from certain companies that had not fully complied with Louisiana law, unconsti-
tutional because it "depriv[ed] the defendants of their liberty without due process of law."
Id. at 589.
88. According to Peckham, the liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment included
the liberty of the individual "to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose to enter into all
contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential to his carrying out to a successful
conclusion the purposes above mentioned." d.
89. 198 U.S. at 45. Lochner involved a New York law prohibiting the employment of
bakery employees for more than ten hours per day or sixty hours per week. The defendant,
Joseph Lochner, was found guilty and was fined for allowing an employee in his bakery to
work greater than sixty hours per week. The New York courts sustained the fine and conviction
which Lochner appealed to the Supreme Court.
90. Id. at 61.
91. Id. at 53 (citing Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 578). Further expanding the nature of this
fundamental right to contract, Peckham noted: "Of course the liberty of contract relating to
labor includes both parties to it. The one has as much right to purchase as the other to sell
labor." Id. at 56.
92. Id. at 53. Noting that the courts had not specifically described or determined the limit
of the state's police powers, Peckham did note that they extended at least as far as to prevent
the individual from making contracts "in violation of a statute, either of the Federal or state
government" or "to let one's property for immoral purposes" or "tor do any other unlawful
act." Id. at 53-54.
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First, the regulation had to have as its purpose a permissible governmental
end.93 Second, assuming that the regulation was aimed at a proper govern-
mental end, the Court would then scrutinize the connection between the
end sought and the means employed by the state to achieve that end.94 The
end result of this test "was the same as though the Court had held, in
today's parlance, that liberty of contract was a fundamental right, to be
restricted only in furtherance of the most compelling state interests. In
effect, the Court applied strict scrutiny." 95 Applying the test, the Court
found that none of the state interests asserted survived strict scrutiny.96
As noted above, the rationale used in Lochner derives primarily from
three Lockean natural law concepts: the idea of rational liberty, the labor
theory of value and the limits on legislative authority. The Lockean idea
of rational liberty is tied to man's position in the state of nature: 97 It is the
status of being
free from restraint and violence from others . . .a Liberty to dispose,
and order, as he lists, his Person, Actions, Possessions, and his whole
Property, within the Allowance of those Laws under which he is; and
therein not to be subject to the arbitrary Will of another, but freely
follow his own.9 8
93. The Court articulated the test as follows:
In every case that comes before this court, therefore, where legislation of this
character is concerned and where the protection of the Federal Constitution is
sought, the question necessarily arises: Is this a fair, reasonable and appropriate
exercise of the police power of the State, or is it an unreasonable, unnecessary
and arbitrary interference with the right of the individual to his personal liberty
or to enter into those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him
appropriate or necessary for the support of himself and his family?
Id. at 56. Since the Court refused to allow the redistribution of wealth or other paternalistic
measures, the category of proper ends became quite narrow. See Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy,
87 CoLuM. L. REv. 873, 877 (1987).
94. Peckham wrote:
The mere assertion that the subject relates though but in a remote degree to the
public health does not necessarily render the enactment valid. The act must have
a more direct relation, as a means to an end, . . . before an act can be held to
be valid which interferes with the general right of an individual to be free in his
person and in his power to contract in relation to his own labor.
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57-58; see Sunstein, supra note 93, at 877.
95. Garfield, Privacy, Abortion, and Judicial Review: Haunted by the Ghost of Lochner,
61 WASH. L. Rv. 293, 298 (1986).
96. The Court refused to uphold the statute's validity as a pure "labor law" because it
failed the first part of the test in that it "involves neither the safety, the morals nor the
welfare of the public, and that the interest of the public is not in the slightest degree affected
by such an act." Lochner, 198 U.S. at 57. According to the Court, the regulation could only
be upheld as a health law. However, the Court argued that the law bore no close relation to
either the quality of the bread produced, id., or an improvement of the health, id. at 59, or
cleanliness of the bakers, id. at 62.
97. Locke describes it as "a State of perfect Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose
of their Possessions, and Persons as they think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature,
without asking leave, or depending upon the Will of any other Man." J. LocKE, supra note
18, bk. II, § 4 (emphasis in original); see supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
98. J. LoCKE, supra note 18, bk. II, § 57 (emphasis in original).
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As a result, the rational liberty view requires that the primary political and
moral purpose of society be the promotion of each individual's capacity
for rational deliberation and self-direction. This rational self-direction in-
cludes not only the maintenance of "personal cognitive capacities" but also
the particular course of action that an individual chooses for his life's
work. 99 Locke follows his theory of rational liberty with a theory to explain
why that chosen life's work has value for the individual.
Locke's labor theory of value begins with the proposition that, "every
Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but
himself."' ° From this Locke argues that "[t]he Labour of his Body, and
the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his[,]" 101 and concludes:
"Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided,
and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something
that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property."'02 Yet although the
Lockean liberal tradition will not allow unbridled and unrestrained labor
and accumulation of property, it sets the following limit: "As much as any
one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils; so much he
may by his labour fix a Property in. Whatever is beyond this, is more than
his share, and belongs to others."103 Thus, the Lockean liberal tradition
requires that the individual be given some latitude as to how vigorously he
will pursue his chosen line of work.
Finally, because the proper end of civil society is the common good' °4
and the common good entails "the mutual Preservation of their Lives,
Liberties and Estates," 105 there naturally emerge several important limits to
the power of the legislature. For present purposes, the most important of
these limitations is that the legislative power "is not, nor can possibly be
99. R. Smrrm, supra note 10, at 237 ("[T]he liberties that can ordinarily be assumed to be
integral to rational liberty would include ... the right to pursue their preferred line of work
subject to attaining suitable qualifications .... ).
100. J. LocKE, supra note 18, bk. II, § 27 (emphasis in original).
101. Id. (emphasis in original).
102. Id. (emphasis in original); see also id. bk. II, § 44 ("though the things of Nature are
given in common, yet Man (by being Master of himself and Proprietor of his own Person,
and the actions or Labour of it) had still in himself the great Foundation of Property"
(emphasis in original)).
Having shown that man acquires property through his labor, Locke illustrates why such
labor is important. He writes: 'Tis Labour then which puts the greatest part of Value upon
Land, without which it would scarcely be worth any thing .... " Id. bk. II, § 43 (emphasis
in original).
103. Id. bk. II, § 31.
104. "mhe power of the Society, or Legislative constituted by them, can never be suppos'd
to extend farther than the common good .... " Id. bk. II, § 131 (emphasis in original); see,
e.g., Corwin, supra note 20, at 393 ("Locke, in the limitations which he imposes on legislative
power, is looking rather to the security of the substantive tights of the individual-those rights
which are implied in the basic arrangements of society at all times and in all places."); see
also id. at 393.
105. J. LocKE, supra note 18, bk. II, § 123 (emphasis in original).
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absolutely Arbitrary over the Lives and Fortunes of the People" because
"it being but the joynt power of every Member of the Society given up to
that Person, or Assembly, which is Legislator, it can be no more than those
persons had in a State of Nature before they enter'd into Society, and gave
it up to the Community." 10 6 From the standpoint of rational liberty,
"political institutions should, through democratic processes, elicit and en-
force prevailing social standards of what constitutes minimally rational,
deliberative conduct and of what preserves the ability to engage in it." 107
Therefore, to be valid, a legislative enactment must pursue the sole legitimate
end of promoting the common good (i.e. better preserving the life, liberty
and property of the individual), and the means must be narrowly tailored
so as not to limit arbitrarily the individual's capacity for rational liberty.
When considered together, Locke's idea of rational liberty, the labor
theory of value and the limits on legislative authority imposed by the
Lockean liberal tradition illustrate that the Lochner Court attempted to
justify in implicit Lockean terms its decision to protect as fundamental the
individual's "right to make a contract." First, the Lochner Court attempted
to determine the true nature of the liberty interest asserted. It found that
the individual's "personal liberty" is equivalent to his ability "to enter into
those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate or
necessary for the support of himself and his family."108 Second, the Court
recognized as fundamental "the rights of individuals, both employers and
employ~s, to make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they may
think best, or which they may agree upon with the other parties to such
contracts." 10 9 These statements reflect two important Lockean principles:
an individual must be free to exercise his capacity for rational liberty by
selecting and pursuing his preferred line of work; in addition, the labor
theory of value requires that he be given some latitude as to how vigorously
he will pursue it.
Having found what it considered a fundamental liberty interest, the
Lochner Court subjected the asserted state interest to heightened scrutiny
and concluded:
Statutes of the nature of that under review, limiting the hours in which
grown and intelligent men may labor to earn their living, are mere
106. Id. bk. II, § 135 (emphasis in original). For a summary of the other limits on the
legislative authority, see id. bk. II, § 142.
107. R. SMn-, supra note 10, at 213.
108. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56; see also Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589 (The due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment protects the right of the individual "to live and work where he
will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and
for that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential" to
his happiness and preservation.); Munn, 94 U.S. at 142 (Field, J., dissenting) (Liberty under
the fourteenth amendment must include the right "to pursue such callings and avocations as
may be most suitable to develop[ing] ... [an individual's] capacities.").
109. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61.
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meddlesome interferences with the rights of the individual, and they are
not saved from condemnation by the claim that they are passed in the
exercise of the police power and upon the subject of the health of the
individual whose rights are interfered with, unless there be some fair
ground, reasonable in and of itself, to say that there is a material danger
to the public health or to the health of the employ6s, if the hours of
labor are not curtailed....
It is manifest to us that the [law here] has no ... direct relation to
and no... substantial effect upon the health of the employ6 .... "0o
This result is also arguably consistent with the Lockean requirement that a
legislative enactment pursue the sole legitimate end of better preserving the
life, liberty and property of the individual and that the means not arbitrarily
restrict the individual's capacity for rational liberty."'
Thus, irrespective of the particular result reached, the Supreme Court's
decision in Lochner illustrates that it implicitly adopted a Lockean approach
in resolving the constitutionality of state regulation of an individual's
asserted "right to contract." Although the Court has since rejected the
Lochner Court's particular heightened scrutiny of economic welfare legis-
lation in favor of a much more deferential rational basis review, Lochner's
approach has nevertheless been carried over into the Court's analysis of
governmental restrictions on non-economic personal liberties.1 2 Accordingly,
110. Id. at 61, 64.
I11. It is also possible that the Lochner majority could have reached a different conclusion
using the same Lockean approach. First, it is plausible that state regulation of maximum hours
within a given occupation is not inconsistent with the rational liberty view so long as the
individual remains free to choose the occupation that he desired and for which he was qualified.
See id. at 69-70 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Second, it is plausible that limiting the working hours
of bakers serves a legitimate societal interest in preserving that person's health (and, in the
end, life) without arbitrarily restricting his capacity for rational liberty. See id. at 72-73.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the conclusions reached by both the majority and the dissent
in Lochner are defensible in Lockean terms, the striking fact remains that the Court utilized
a Lockean approach in resolving the issues before it.
112. The transition is noted in the oft-quoted case of United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144 (1938). Initially, the Court noted its reluctance to pursue heightened scrutiny of
pure welfare legislation. Such economic regulations were "not to be pronounced unconstitu-
tional unless in light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character
as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and
experience of the legislators." Id. at 152. However, the Court went on in the footnote following
this statement to argue that "[t]here may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption
of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of
the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific
when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth." Id. at 152 n.4.
The Court has also recognized that its recent utilization of substantive due process analysis
in the privacy area stems from its earlier use of the doctrine during the Lochner era. See,
e.g., Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977); see also C. WoLu', supra
note 4, at 6 ("The initial backing off of the Court seemed to augur a new era of judicial
deference, but, in fact, the focus of judicial activism simply shifted from economic affairs to
civil liberties."); id. at 162 ("IThe constitutional doctrine of substantive due process survived
the demolition of economic due process perfectly intact." (emphasis in original)).
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as shall be demonstrated, the Court has also merely transferred the Lockean
concerns that gave life to the Lochner Court's "strict scrutiny" review of
economic legislation to the Court's creation and increased protection of a
fundamental right of privacy.
IV. THE LoCKEAN LIBERAL TRADITION AND THE PRIVACY CASES ' 3
The modern privacy cases reflect the Supreme Court's struggle to deter-
mine the existence and scope of a fundamental right to privacy. This right
currently includes "certain rights of freedom of choice in marital, sexual,
and reproductive matters.""14 However, these cases fail to establish any
principled approach to substantive due process analysis that would support
and harmonize the Court's decisions." 5 The attractiveness of a Lockean
moral philosophy approach is that it provides the Court with a principled
basis for deciding privacy cases, a basis which would temper the Court's
past desire to recognize individual rights to the exclusion of other societal
concerns," 6 between which the due process clauses were intended to mediate.
Under the Lockean liberal tradition, an individual's natural law duty to
preserve both the life of, and capacity for rational liberty in, his fellow
man limits that individual's natural rights." 7 Moreover, the Lockean liberal
tradition repeatedly emphasizes the duty of the individual to conform his
conduct to the legitimate interests of civil society." 8 As a result, adherence
to a Lockean moral philosophy approach to substantive due process analysis
that incorporates these changes requires a court to approach the issues
raised in the modern privacy cases in a manner somewhat different than
that currently employed by the Supreme Court.
First, the Court should scrutinize carefully the fundamental nature of the
privacy interest asserted to determine whether it truly affects the individual's
capacity for rational deliberation and self-direction. If the asserted privacy
interest does directly involve the individual's rational liberty, it should be
113. In the matter of abortion the words of the Constitution did not change, but on
January 22, 1973, its meaning did. On that date Justice Harry Blackmun found
in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of power to the People or in the Fourteenth
Amendment's reference to liberty-he was not entirely sure in which-a liberty
to consent to an abortion. On that date the Constitution came to mean that
abortion was an American freedom.
J. NOONAN, supra note 10, at 9.
114. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra note 80, at 684.
115. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
116. See Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual Privacy-
Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REv. 463, 469 (1983); see, e.g., id.
at 472 ("One of the most serious errors made by some lower court judges attempting to apply
a constitutional right of privacy has been to assume, as a first analytical step, that any 'private'
conduct is part of due process liberty." (emphasis in original)).
117. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
118. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
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classified as "fundamental." Accordingly, any state regulation of that
privacy interest must survive a form of "strict scrutiny" review: The state
must show that the capacity for rational deliberation and self-direction in
others is significantly restricted or inhibited by the unregulated exercise of
the asserted privacy interest. If, however, the asserted privacy interest does
not involve the individual's capacity for rational liberty, it should not be
classified as "fundamental." Any state regulation of that privacy interest
would be subject merely to a form of "rational basis" review: Although
the state could not arbitrarily prohibit that activity, any rational purpose
for the regulation would usually be sufficient. 19 Under this new approach,
society's compelling interest in promoting the rational liberty of all will
ensure that minority interests that do not unduly burden the capacities for
rational deliberation and self-direction in others will be given at least as
much, if not more, protection than is ensured by the Court's current
approach. Thus, by rethinking the modem privacy cases under this Lockean
moral philosophy approach, courts can achieve results that are more con-
sistent, analytically sound and well-supported by a coherent moral philos-
ophy.
A. The Origins of the Modern Privacy Right
The use of a Lockean moral philosophy approach is not new to consti-
tutional analysis. Early in the development of American constitutional
jurisprudence, courts accepted this approach as a legitimate means of
constitutional review of legislative determinations.' 20 An example is Calder
v. Bull'2' where the Court used a Lockean moral philosophy approach to
uphold a legislature's decision to order a new trial in a will contest because
that action was not an ex post facto law forbidden the states by article I,
section 10 of the Constitution.'2 Writing for the Court, Justice Chase noted
several important principles of the Lockean liberal tradition inherent in
constitutional analysis:
The people of the United States erected their Constitutions, or forms
of government, to establish justice, to promote the general welfare, to
secure the blessings of liberty; and to protect their persons and property
from violence. The purposes for which men enter into society will
determine the nature and terms of the social compact; and as they are
the foundation of the legislative power, they will decide what are the
119. See generally R. Sm, supra note 10, at 236-39.
120. For an example of the use of natural law principles in constitutional decisionmaking
concerning the validity of slavery before the Civil War, see R. COVER, JUSTICE AccusED 31-
116 (1975).
121. 3 U.S. (3 Dal.) 386 (1798).
122. Id. at 387, 389.
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proper objects of it: The nature, and ends of legislative power will limit
the exercise of it."
Using these principles, Justice Chase concluded, "An ACT of the Legislature
(for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the social
compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority."' 24
This Lockean moral philosophy approach to decisionmaking reemerged
in several "privacy" decisions which were rendered during the Lochner
period. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 125 Justice McReynolds noted that the scope
of the liberty protected by the fourteenth amendment included not only
those economic liberties identified in Lochner, 26 but also the right of the
individual "to marry, establish a- home and bring up children, to worship
God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.' '127 The Court took a similar Lockean
approach in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,-28 where Justice McReynolds de-
fended the liberty of parents and guardians "to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control .... The child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.' 29
Finally, a broad concept of personal liberties protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment was identified by Justice Harlan thirty-
six years later in his dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman."0 Rejecting the
majority's decision to dismiss on justiciability grounds the appeals of three
plaintiffs who alleged that a Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contra-
ceptives by married couples violated their due process rights, Justice Harlan
123. Id. at 388 (emphasis in original).
124. Id. (emphasis in original). Although he concurred with the judgment of the Court,
Justice Iredell did not believe that such a natural law jurisprudence was at all appropriate for
the Court. He criticized it as illegitimate because "[tihe ideas of natural justice are regulated
by no fixed standard" and "the ablest and purest men have differed upon the subject." Id.
at 399 (Iredell, J., concurring). He concluded: "If . . . the Legislature of the Union, or the
Legislature of any member of the Union, shall pass a law, within the general scope of their
constitutional power, the Court cannot pronounce it to be void, merely because it is, in their
judgment, contrary to the principles of natural justice." Id.
125.-262 U.S. 390 (1923). The Court reversed the conviction of a German teacher for
violating a state law proscribing instruction in foreign languages to young children. Id. at 400-
03.
126. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). McReynolds characterized them as "the
right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, [and]
to acquire useful knowledge." Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
127. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399. Again, the rights articulated bear a striking resemblance to
those ends deemed fundamental under the rational liberty view.
128. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). The Court invalidated an Oregon law Which required all children
to attend public schools. Id. at 534-35.
129. Id.
130. 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
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concluded that the statute was "an intolerable and unjustifiable invasion of
privacy in the conduct of the most intimate concerns of an individual's
personal life."'' Justice Harlan rejected the notion that due process was
merely a procedural safeguard and claimed instead that its reach extended
to all fundamental rights for the protection of which men enter into
society.3 2 He also argued that its contents could not be determined by
reference to any "formula" or "code," but rather insisted that due process
"has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of
respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and
the demands of organized society."' 33
These early "privacy" cases illustrate that a coherent and principled
substantive due process analysis can occur when that analysis is grounded
in a Lockean moral philosophy approach to discovering fundamental rights.
First, Justice McReynold's opinions in Meyer and Pierce and Justice Har-
lan's opinion in Poe all properly identify the relative importance of the
privacy interest asserted. The individual's interest in freedom from state
interference with matters of marriage, procreation and child rearing all serve
to advance the primary end of the Lockean liberal tradition: fostering
the rational liberty of the individual (i.e., his capacity for rational deliber-
ation and self-direction). Second, Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe
recognizes the need to balance the properly analyzed liberty interests of the
individual against the demands and interests of society, all of which are
discoverable in the Lockean traditions out of which our country developed.
Third, in Meyer, Pierce and Poe, the governmental regulation at issue did
not survive strict scrutiny review because the state could not show that the
capacities for rational liberty in others would be inhibited by unregulated
pursuit of the asserted privacy interests. Rethinking the three landmark
131. Id. at 539 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan wrote: "[The intimacy of husband
and wife is necessarily an essential and accepted feature of the institution of marriage, an
institution which the State not only must allow, but which always and in every age it has
fostered and protected." Id. at 553.
132. Id. at 541. Rejecting the suggestion that this liberty is a "series of isolated points,"
Justice Harlan described it as "a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a
freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints, and which also
recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain interests require
particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment." Id. at 543
(citations omitted).
133. Id. at 542. As if replying to Justice Iredell's criticism of natural law jurisprudence as
too open-ended, Justice Harlan responded that the process has not been "one where judges
have felt free to roam where unguided speculation might take them. The balance of which I
speak is the balance struck by this country, having regard to what history teaches are the
traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from which it broke." Id. Assuming
that the Lockean liberal tradition is a "tradition from which [our country] developed," then
Justice Harlan would likely have accepted the Lockean liberal tradition as a primary, if not
exclusive, source for discovering the content of substantive due process rights.
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modern privacy cases 4 in Lockean terms illustrates that the Lockean liberal
tradition is a principled basis on which to ground a moral philosophy
approach to constitutional decisionmaking in the privacy area.
B. Griswold v. Connecticut
The age of modern substantive due process analysis dawned with the
Supreme Court's decision in Griswold,' where the Court finally decided
the constitutionality of the Connecticut birth control law. Although the
Griswold Court was unable to reach a consensus regarding the proper
method for determining those liberties entitled to protection under the due
process clause, the Lockean moral philosophy approach produces a con-
vincing rationale in support of the Griswold Court's ultimate decision to
protect as fundamental a right of privacy in decisions regarding intimate
aspects of the 'Marital relationship. This result follows from the Lockean
description of conjugal relationships and paternal (or parental) authority as
distinct from political authority, and from the limited nature of any coun-
tervailing societal interests that would seek to limit these liberty interests.
The appellants in Griswold were two physicians who "gave information,
instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means of
preventing conception" in violation of the Connecticut statute. 3 6 The Court,
in an opinion authored by Justice Douglas, invalidated the statute as an
impermissible restriction on the right of privacy of married couples, a liberty
it claimed to be protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. Justice Douglas characterized the privacy interest as "an inti-
mate relation of husband and wife and their physician's role in one aspect
of that relation.' ' 37 Douglas claimed protection for this interest by finding
that it lay within a "zone of privacy" that had been created by "penumbras"
from several specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.'38 Since the Consti-
134. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
135. 381 U.S. at 479.
136. Id. at 480 (emphasis in original). Although the statute on its face applied only to the
use of contraceptivesby any person, the appellants, both doctors, were found guilty of assisting
the married couples in violating the Connecticut statute and were fined $100 each as accessories.
Id.
137. Id. at 482.
138. Id. at 484-85. Justice Douglas found that these penumbras emanated from the first,
third, fourth, fifth and ninth amendments. See id. at 482-85. He then concluded:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our
political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for
better or for worse, hopefully, enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony
in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.
Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions.
Id. at 486.
[Vol. 65:723
PRIVACY RIGHTS
tution protected this right of privacy, the government's use of the criminal
law to regulate that relationship swept too broadly to survive constitutional
scrutiny. 139
Because the justices in Griswold could not reach any consensus regarding
the proper method for determining those liberties entitled to protection
under the due process clause, examination of several of the other opinions
helps to flesh out the issues relevant to the Lockean moral philosophy
approach. First, Justice Goldberg wrote separately to voice his belief that
the primary source of this unenunciated right of privacy is the ninth
amendment.'40 Agreeing with Justice Harlan's Poe dissent, Goldberg claimed
that judges should determine whether an asserted privacy right is funda-
mental by reference to the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our
people" and whether it "is of such a character that it cannot be denied
without violating those 'fundamental principles of liberty ... which lie at
the base of all our civil and political institutions." '" 14' Applying a strict
scrutiny test under which the governmental interest must be "compelling"
and the law in question "necessary" to the accomplishment of the govern-
mental interest, Goldberg concluded that the statute swept "unnecessarily
broadly, reaching far beyond the evil sought to be dealt with and intruding
upon the privacy of all married couples. ' 142
Justice Harlan concurred in the result but wrote separately to reassert
essentially the position he had articulated four years earlier in his dissent
in Poe.'14 Harlan argued that "[t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment stands ... on its own bottom,"' 44 and that the proper test for
determining whether the asserted right is fundamental is by reference to
values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' 145 He claimed that
judicial restraint in such a process could be achieved by "respect for the
teachings of history," recognition of "the basic values that underlie our
society" and "appreciation of the great roles that the doctrines of federalism
and separation of powers have played in establishing and preserving Amer-
ican freedoms."' 46
Justice White's concurring opinion comes closest to articulating a Lockean
moral philosophy approach to substantive due process in the privacy area.
139. Id. at 485.
140. Id. at 487-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 493 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) and Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (quoting Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926))).
Under this approach, Goldberg found that the right of privacy was a fundamental personal
right. Id. at 494.
142. Id. at 498 (emphasis added).
143. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring); see supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
144. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring).
145. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
146. Id. at 501.
1990]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
White would require a detailed examination of the nature of the privacy
interest asserted, 47 as well as strict scrutiny of the governmental or social
interest asserted and the means chosen to achieve those ends.'4 Applying
these standards, White relied on Meyer, Pierce and other cases as having
already established that the liberty entitled to protection under the fourteenth
amendment included the right to be "free of regulation of the intimacies
of the marriage relationship.'' 49 Accordingly, he found the statute uncon-
stitutional because of "the sweeping scope of [the] statute" and "its telling
effect on the freedoms of married persons." 50
Justices Black and Stewart dissented from the decision, asserting that
there was no basis for judicial protection of a right to privacy. Justice
Black asserted that there is no basis for a judicial formulation of funda-
mental rights other than those found in the specifics of the first eight
amendments.' 5' He expressed his disagreement with the approaches of Justices
Goldberg, Harlan and White because each allowed judges to "roam at will
in the limitless area of their own beliefs"' 52 and amounted to "merely using
different words to claim for this Court and the federal judiciary power to
invalidate any legislative act which the judges find irrational, unreasonable,
or offensive."' 15 3 Justice Stewart dissented on essentially the same grounds
as Justice Black, although his opinion dealt largely with Justice Goldberg's
ninth amendment analysis. 54
These opinions identify two natural rights issues that must be analyzed
under the Lockean moral philosophy approach. First, the Court defended
a fundamental right of privacy within marriage to be free from state
regulation regarding the intimacies of the marriage relationship. 55 The Court
held that this freedom includes the decision of whether to use contraceptives.
Second, the Court found that there are no governmental interests strong
enough to justify a total ban on the use of contraceptives by married
individuals. 56 This is an affirmation of the principle that government has
a very limited role in regulating conduct within the marital relationship, a
relationship that is essential to promotion and protection of an individual's
rational liberty.
The first step under the Lockean moral philosophy approach is to identify
the true nature of the privacy interest asserted. It emerges from Locke's
147. Id. at 503 (White, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 503-04.
149. Id. at 502-03 (emphasis added).
150. Id. at 507 (emphasis added).
151. See id. at 508-10 (Black, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 525-26 (quoting Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 92 (1947) (Black, J.,
dissenting)).
153. Id. at 511.
154. See id. at 529-31 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 482, 486; see also id. at 502-03 (White, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 485-86.
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description of the marital relationship and his discussion of parental au-
thority. Locke defines conjugal society as:
[A] voluntary Compact between Man and Woman: and tho' it consist
chiefly in such a Communion and Right in one anothers Bodies, as is
necesssary to its chief End, Procreation; yet it draws with it mutual
Support, and Assistance, and a Communion of Interest too, as necessary
not only to unite their Care, and Affection, but also necessary to their
common Off-spring, who have a Right to be nourished and maintained
by them, till they are able to provide for themselves. 57
Viewed in this way, the marriage relationship has several important features.
First, it appears that the terms of the marriage agreement will be subject
to negotiation.' Second, the marriage relationship assists both husband
and wife to define the courses they will pursue in life: "[I]t draws with it
mutual Support, and Assistance, and a Communion of Interest too, as
necessary ... to unite their Care, and Affection . . . .' 9 Accordingly,
when the marriage relationship no longer serves any of these ends, Locke
permits it to be terminated. 16° In sum, the marriage relationship is important
in the Lockean liberal tradition because it fosters the freedom of two distinct
individuals to select and order their intimate personal relationships.
The parent-child relationship is one in which "Parents have a sort of
Rule and Jurisdiction over [their children] when they come into the World,
and for some time after, but 'tis a temporary one."' 61 Incumbent in this
"rule and jurisdiction" is a positive duty or obligation to "nourish, preserve,
and bring up their Off-spring."' 62 Hence, consistent with this overall natural
rights philosophy, the parents' right to raise and direct the affairs of their
157. J. LocKE, supra note 18, bk. II, § 78. Despite the importance Locke placed on this
relationship between man and wife, it was not viewed as a never-ending product of biological
forces, but rather as a "voluntary compact" entered into by each.
158. "Community of Goods, and the Power over them, mutual Assistance, and Maintenance,
and other things belonging to Conjugal Society, might be varied and regulated by that Contract,
which unites Man and Wife in that Society, as far as may consist with Procreation and the
bringing up of Children ....." Id. bk. II, § 83 (emphasis in original).
159. Id. bk. II, § 78.
160. [I]t would give one reason to enquire, why this Compact, where Procreation
and Education are secured, and Inheritance taken care for, may not be made
determinable, either by consent, or at a certain time, or upon certain Conditions
... there being no necessity in the nature of the thing, nor to the ends of it,
that it should always be for Life ....
Id. bk. II, § 81 (emphasis in original).
161. Id. bk. II, § 55.
162. Id. bk. II, § 66; see also id. bk. II, § 63 (Nature has enjoined parents to "imploy this
Care on their Off-spring, and hath placed in them suitable Inclinations of Tenderness and
Concern to temper this power, to apply it ... to the Childrens good, as long as they should
need be under it."); id. bk. II, §§ 56, 65; R. AsHc.Anr, supra note 33, at 73 ("Locke insists
that children have a natural right to subsistence, and that parents have an obligation to provide
that subsistence .... It is only through the fulfilment of this duty that parents act in
accordance with the general objective of natural law to preserve mankind.").
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children within the marital relationship derives directly from their naturally
imposed duty "to take care of their Off-spring, during the imperfect state
of Childhood."'' 63 Therefore, although one aspect of parental authority is
a positive duty to raise and nourish children, that duty also carries with it
two very important rights. First, parents are entitled to make certain choices
regarding the course of a child's education and upbringing. Second, they
are given the opportunity to expose that child to the values and courses of
conduct that the parents have selected as important through their own
capacity for rational deliberation and self-direction.
When considered together, Locke's discussions of the marriage relation-
ship and parental authority reveal the fundamental nature of the liberty
interest at issue: privacy in marriage to be free from state regulation
regarding the intimacies of the marriage relationship. Protecting freedom
within the marital relationship promotes the rational liberty of the individual
because it enables him to choose those courses of conduct essential to his
emotional fulfillment.164 Similarly, the obligation and right of parents to
raise their children also fosters rational liberty because it protects the
freedom of parents to expose their children to those values and courses of
action they find most important and fulfilling.
This characterization of the true nature of the liberty interest at issue in
Griswold is evident in several of the Court's pronouncements. First, the
Griswold Court recognized marriage as "a coming together for better or
for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred"
and a relationship "that promotes a way of life, . . . a harmony of living
... [and] a bilateral loyalty."1 65 Second, the Meyer Court recognized as
fundamental the rights "to marry, establish a home and bring up children
... and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men."' Third, there
is Justice Goldberg's recognition that "[tihe entire fabric of the Constitution
and the purposes that clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate
that the rights to marital privacy and to marry and raise a family are of
similar order and magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically pro-
tected." 6 7
163. J. LOCKE, supra note 18, bk. II, § 58. Locke sees this duty as absolute: "The
Nourishment and Education of their Children, is a Charge so incumbent on Parents for their
Childrens good, that nothing can absolve them from taking care of it." Id. bk. II, § 67.
164. R. SauT, supra note 10, at 237 ("[I]f the state prevents persons from taking actions
essential to their emotional fulfillment, such as marriage, and these actions are perfectly
consistent with preserving rational liberty in themselves and others, then something central to
their rational self-governance, or their pursuit of happiness, 'has been infringed.").
165. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
166. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
167. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also Pierce,
268 U.S. at 534-35 (Parents have the right "to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control," and "the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
[their child] for additional obligations.").
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Because the asserted privacy interest is fundamental, state regulation of
that activity must serve a compelling state interest. The societal interests
implicated in the area of parental and conjugal relations in the Lockean
liberal tradition are similar to those identified by the Griswold Court. As
in Griswold, it is possible that banning the use of contraceptives by married
couples would support a societal interest in prohibiting "all forms of
promiscuous or illicit sexual relationships, be they premarital or extramar-
ital," 68 provided it furthered the "Peace, Safety, and publick good of the
People." 169 This, however, is a very unlikely result under the rational liberty
view because "[flor such regulation to be sustained . .. it would have to
be supported by a showing of compelling state interests, assertions that the
capacities for rational self-direction of others would ber too greatly endan-
gered if a certain course is pursued."' 170 Because these premarital or extra-
marital relationships did not restrict the rational liberties of others (including
married couples), the state's interest is minimal. Accordingly, a legislative
prohibition on the use of contraceptives by married couples to promote
society's interest in inhibiting premarital and extramarital relations falls for
overbreadth because it interferes with society's deeper interest in protecting
the marital freedoms to which a husband and wife are entitled.
Society also could assert that a ban on contraceptives furthers the chief
end of marriage in the Lockean liberal tradition: procreation, 71 The argu-
ment would be that a married couple has a natural duty to procreate and
that contraception undermines and inhibits that end. This argument, how-
ever, is unpersuasive given the broader importance that the Lockean liberal
tradition places on the marriage relationship. First, although Locke does
concede that the civil magistrate "decides any Controversie that may arise
between Man and Wife [concerning the ends of marriage,]" he denies such
adjudicative or legislative power to "abridge the Right, or Power of either
naturally necessary to those ends, viz. Procreation and mutual Support and
Assistance whilst they are together .... "172 Thus, civil society cannot ban
the use of contraceptives because it would undermine society's deeper interest
in protecting marriage as a means for individuals to order their most intimate
personal relationships. Second, the freedom to use contraceptives would
actually assist parents in their duty to nourish and maintain their children.
By having fewer chidren, parents can devote more time and resources to
the physical, emotional and intellectual development of their existing chil-
dren. Thus, there is no compelling societal interest in restricting the right
of married couples to use contraceptives. Both society and the individuals
168. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 505 (White, J., concurring).
169. J. Locn, supra note 18, bk. II, § 131 (emphasis in original).
170. R. Smiri, supra note 10, at 237.
171. See supra text accompanying note 157.
172. J. LocKE, supra note 18, bk. II, § 83.
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within the marital relationship instead benefit from broad freedoms in terms
of procreation and child rearing because they foster individual rational
liberty.73
An analysis under the Lockean moral philosophy approach of the various
interests asserted in the Griswold opinions produces a result wholly consistent
with that actually reached by the Supreme Court in Griswold. The Lockean
liberal tradition recognizes a fundamental right of privacy inherent in marital
relationships and a right to freedom in decisionmaking concerning when to
marry and divorce, how to raise children and matters of procreation,
including contraception. Moreover, although the Lockean liberal tradition
does allow the political authority to legislate for the public good, it would
find, as did the Griswold Court, that legislation proscribing the use of
contraceptives by married couples serves no compelling state interest. In
fact, such regulation wrongfully interferes with the liberties of married
couples and is contrary to the best interests of society in fostering the
rational liberty of the individual.
C. Roe v. Wade
In Roe 74 the Supreme Court protected as fundamental a limited privacy
right in women regarding the decision of whether to abort an unborn fetus.
The Court's overarching protection of this fundamental right of privacy,
however, is indefensible under a Lockean moral philosophy approach. While
women may have a fundamental right of privacy in the abortion decision
based on their rights to rational liberty, society has a sufficiently compelling
interest that justifies legislative regulation of this privacy interest: the unborn
fetus' potential capacity to exercise rational liberty. An examination of the
Roe decision and corresponding Lockean principles implicated by a proper
Lockean approach to substantive due process will show the error of the
Court's result.
Jane Roe challenged the constitutionality of the Texas criminal abortion
statutes which proscribed all abortions except those procured or attempted
upon medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. 75 In
173. Locke writes that "all the ends of Marriage [should] be obtained under Politick
Government, as well as in the state of Nature . . . ." Id. (emphasis in original). Accepting
the earlier discussion which pointed to a large measure of freedom for husband and wife in
conjugal and parent-child relationships outside political society, this statement entails the same
result within political society.
174. 410 U.S. at 113.
175. The case was filed by an unmarried, pregnant woman who wished to terminate her
pregnancy by abortion. The district court ruled that the Texas statutes were facially unconsti-
tutional due to vagueness and overbreadth. All parties took protective appeals to the Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit which ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision
by the U.S. Supreme Court. Id. at 120-22.
[Vol. 65:723
PRIVACY RIGHTS
holding the Texas statutes unconstitutional, Justice Blackmun surveyed the
history of abortion and concluded that abortion had been an historically
accepted procedure. 176 Blackmun then recited and rejected three arguments
that had been advanced to explain the historic enactment of abortion laws.' 77
Finally, Blackmun examined the nature of the pregnant woman's interest,
concluding that "the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision,
but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against
important state interests in regulation."' 17 Based on these considerations,
Blackmun adopted a strict scrutiny approach to analyzing the state interests
in conflict with this fundamental right and concluded that the state's interests
could only override the abortion right when compelling and narrowly drawn
to express only legitimate state interests.179
Turning to the other side of the balance, Blackmun rejected the state's
argument that the fetus was a "person" within the language and meaning
of the fourteenth amendment."10 He also rejected the state's argument that
a compelling interest in the life of the fetus existed from conception, 8'
176. Id. at 129-47.
177. See id. at 147-52. First, Blackmun rejected that the laws were "the product of a
Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct[,]" because the state had not
advanced that justification and "no court or commentator has taken the argument seriously,"
and because such a justification was not a proper state purpose in the first place. Id. at 148
(footnote omitted). Second, Blackmun argued that although the state did have valid interests
in ensuring that the procedure was performed under safe conditions, especially in the late
stages of pregnancy, the state's interest in "protecting the woman from an inherently hazardous
procedure ... has largely disappeared." Id. at 149. Finally, Blackmun responded that there
was considerable dispute whether the asserted interest in protecting the potential life that exists
from the moment of conception was a purpose behind enacting the statutes. He concluded
that it was this justification around which the case and the constitutionality of the statute
centered. Id. at 151-52.
178. Id. at 154. In analyzing the nature of the privacy right asserted, Justice Blackmun
noted that in the past the right of privacy had included such individual interests as marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships and child rearing and education. Id. at 152-
53. He then concluded that "the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and
restrictions upon state action" or "the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people"
was broad enough to include the woman's decision to keep or terminate a pregnancy. Id. at
153. Blackmun further articulated the nature of the privacy right asserted by identifying the
potential harms in denying a woman that choice. These included: medical harm from pregnancy
and distress for the woman and family of an unwanted child; the burdens of child care; and
the potential of a continuing social stigma associated with unwed motherhood. Id.
Despite such interests, Blackmun rejected an argument based on past privacy decisions that
"one has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases." Id. at 154. He based this
rejection on the state's interests in "safeguarding health, in maintaining medical standards,
and in protecting potential life." Id.
179. Id. at 155.
180. In rejecting this argument, Blackmun placed special emphasis on the fact that "no
case could be cited that holds that a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 157. Blackmun then examined the uses of the word "person" in the
Constitution and argued that "the use of the word is such that it has application only
postnatally." Id.
181. Blackmun rejected the necessity of deciding whether life begins at conception since
"those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable
to arrive at any consensus." Id. at 159.
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although Blackmun did recognize the state's limited interest in protecting
the life and health of the mother. 82
Balancing the alleged interests of the state in protecting prenatal life
against a woman's alleged right of privacy, Blackmun concluded that the
latter generally outweighed the former and articulated a trimester approach
to accommodate these interests. 3 During the first trimester, when the
nonviable fetus is not considered a "person" and the abortion procedure
presents few risks to the health of the mother, she has unlimited power to
terminate a pregnancy. 8 4 During the second trimester, when the abortion
procedure involves greater risks to the health of the mother, the state can
regulate the procedure in ways reasonably related to the health of the
mother. 8 5 Finally, during the third trimester, the state may totally proscribe
abortion where it can establish a compelling interest in protecting potential
human life. 86
Justice Stewart, while concurring in the judgment, wrote separately to
emphasize a reversal from his position in Griswold. a7 Arguing that the
Griswold decision could be rationally understood only as "holding that the
Connecticut statute substantively invaded the 'liberty' that is protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," he concluded that
"Griswold stands as one in a long line of ... cases decided under the
doctrine of substantive due process, and I now accept it as such."'8 s Justice
Rehnquist dissented from the decision on several grounds, chiefly that the
broad right of privacy recognized by the majority was not part of the liberty
protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
8 9
182. "[I]t is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at some point in time
another interest, that of health of the mother ... becomes significantly involved." Id.
183. See id. at 162-66.
184. Id. at 163.
185. Id. Blackmun noted three examples of permissible state regulation: requirements as to
the qualifications of the person performing the abortion; requirements as to the facility in
which the abortion will take place; and requirements as to the licensing of the individual to
perform the abortion or the licensing of the facility. Id.
186. Blackmun found the compelling point for the state's interest at the point of viability
"because the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's
womb[,]" giving it "both logical and biological justifications." Blackmun then articulated the
scope of this regulation: "If the State is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it
may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother." Id. at 163-64.
187. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
188. Roe, 410 U.S. at 168 (Stewart, J., concurring). Stewart placed great emphasis on the
Eisenstadt holding that the due process clause protected "the right of the individual, married
or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." Id. at 169-70 (quoting
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (emphasis in original)). He concluded that if
such a right were protected as a personal liberty under the due process clause, it had also to
include the decision whether to terminate a pregnancy. Id. at 170.
189. Id. at 172-73 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Rehnquist felt that the Court articulated an
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Justice Blackmun's opinion identifies several "natural rights" issues that
must be analyzed under a Lockean moral philosophy approach to the
abortion question. 9' First, the Court held, as noted above, that a woman
possesses a right of privacy, discoverable in either the ninth or fourteenth
amendments, which includes the right to decide whether to terminate a
pregnancy. 19' Second, in analyzing the societal interests, the Court found
that an unborn fetus is not a "person" with rights guaranteed protection
under the fourteenth amendment because "the unborn have never been
recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense."' 192 However, the Court
did recognize that a woman's right of privacy is not unlimited and that the
state does have an "important and legitimate interest in protecting the
potentiality of human life."' 193
The first step under the Lockean moral philosophy approach is to
determine whether the asserted privacy interest is fundamental. Although
Locke never specifically mentions abortion in either of his two treatises,
some of Locke's pronouncements lead to the conclusion that a woman
could have a fundamental property and liberty right to control of her own
body. Specifically, Locke's discussion of the rights of a woman in the state
of nature and in both parental and conjugal relationships bears a striking
resemblance to the fundamental right of privacy articulated in Roe. This
right of privacy derives from a woman's right of rational liberty which
emerges from Locke's destructive refutation of Filmer's argument for pa-
triarchy and from a constructive argument based on parental and conjugal
relationships.
Locke's argument against Filmer's position begins with the assertion that,
based on Genesis 3:16,194 God did not affirmatively give man a grant of
political power over woman. Rather, God merely suggested or foretold an
empirical relationship which man subsequently adopted:
God, in this Text, gives not, that I see, any Authority to Adam over
Eve, or to Men over their Wives, but only foretels what should be the
overly broad formulation of the rights protected by the due process clause. He accepted the
assertion that "the 'liberty,' against deprivation of which without due process the Fourteenth
Amendment protects, embraces more than the rights found in the Bill of Rights." Id. However,
Rehnquist argued that since that liberty is guaranteed against deprivation only without due
process of law, the Court should continue to apply the rational basis test it has traditionally
applied to such social and economic legislation. Id. at 173.
190. "[Roe] involved a fundamental moral question ... concerning the human personhood
and rights of biological human life ... and thus implicated the most fundamental principles
of the regime-the right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness." C. Worm, supra note 4,
at 308.
191. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153, 154.
192. Id. at 162.
193. Id.
194. "To the woman he said, 'I will greatly increase your pains in childbearing; with pain
you will give birth to children. Your desire will be for your husband, and he will rule over
you."' Genesis 3:16 (New International Version).
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Womans Lot, how by his Providence he would order it so, that she
should be subject to her husband, as we see that generally the Laws of
Mankind and customs of Nations have ordered it so; and there is, I
grant, a Foundation in Nature for it.' 9
Although Locke could not deny that he lived in a world where subjection
of women was an evident reality, he maintained that God did not, by divine
grant of authority, give to men any kind of political authority over women
in a state of nature.
Locke expands a woman's individual rights when he argues that a mother
has independent title to honor from her children. Here Locke takes exception
to Filmer's construction of the commandment to "honor thy father and
thy mother" as meaning that only the father is entitled to honor and that
he has an absolute monarchical power. Noting that the Scripture refers to
both mother and father, Locke concludes: "[T]he mother [has] by this Law
of God, a right to Honour from her Children, which is not Subject to the
Will of her Husband .... 196 With these two propositions, Locke further
expands a woman's rights by joining the protection against political domin-
ion by a woman's husband with a positive right of the woman to be honored
by her children. 97
Locke's denouncement of Filmer concludes with the assertion that, based
on Genesis 1:28,198 God did not give man alone sole dominion over the
goods of the earth. Instead, Locke uses this verse to articulate the roots of
a right in women to private property. Locke notes, "God blessed them,
and said unto them, Have Dominion."' 199 Even though Locke accepts the
fact that social custom, and perhaps the dictates of natural law, require
that a woman be, to some extent, subject to the authority of her husband,
he still recognizes that she should possess some right to property.2° Thus,
although Locke's chief purpose in the first treatise is to refute Filmer's
argument from Scripture for absolute monarchy, there emerges at least the
195. J. LocKE, supra note 18, bk. I, § 47 (emphasis in original); see also Butler, Early
Liberal Roots of Feminism: John Locke and the Attack on Patriarchy, 72 AM. POL. SCL REV.
135, 142-43 (1978) ("Locke largely accepted the empirical fact of women's inferiority and saw
it grounded in nature as ordered by God. He attempted to avoid the conclusion that Adam
became Eve's superior or that husbands became their wives' superiors ... .
196. J. LoCKE, supra note 18, bk. I, § 63.
197. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 195, at 143 ("A mother's title to honor from her children
was independent of the will of her husband.").
198. "God blessed them and said to them, 'Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the
earth and subdue it. Rule over the fish of the sea and the birds of the air and over every
living creature that moves on the ground."' Genesis 1:28 (New International Version).
199. J. LocicE, supra note 18, bk. I, § 29 (emphasis in original).
200. If it be said that Eve was subjected to Adam, it seems she was not so subjected
to him, as to hinder her Dominion over the Creatures, or Property in them: for
shall we say that God ever made a joint Grant to two, and one only was to
have the benefit of it?
Id. (emphasis in original).
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roots of a theory of "feminism" which supports a woman's right to privacy.
If the argument for a right to abortion rested solely on Locke's first
treatise, it would easily fall to the criticism that Locke intended merely to
refute a theory of patriarchy, not to establish positively property and liberty
interests in women. When combined with Locke's description of a woman's
role in parental and conjugal relationships, however, a positive argument
for a right of privacy in the woman emerges. Locke begins this discussion
in the second treatise by immediately rejecting any notions of patriarchy
and affirmatively reasserting the equality of women: "[I]f we consult Reason
or Revelation, we shall find she hath an equal Title .... For whatever
obligation Nature and the right of Generation lays on Children, it must
certainly bind them equal to both the concurrent Causes of it."'' Although
at times Locke refers to paternal and not parental authority, it is nonetheless
clear that he places woman on an equal footing with her husband regarding
their roles as parents.
Locke's analysis of the conjugal relationship produces a much more
comprehensive argument for the individual rights of women. Locke asserts
that the conjugal relationship does not result from a decision by a man to
marry a woman but rather in "a voluntary Compact between Man and
Woman," 02 who are two contracting equals. Although conjugal society
arises out of the need for procreation and persists among humans for a
much longer time than for animals because of the long-term dependency of
children on their parents, Locke suggests it need not be permanent:
[I]t would give one reason to enquire, why this Compact, where Pro-
creation and Education are secured, and Inheritence taken care for, may
not be made determinable, either by consent, or at a certain time, or
upon certain Conditions, as well as any other voluntary Compacts, there
being no necessity in the nature of the thing, nor to the ends of it, that
it should always be for Life . ...23
Locke further expands a woman's rights to include that of divorce as long
as her procreative and supportive responsibilities have been fulfilled. 4
In addition to a limited right of divorce, Locke asserts that a husband's
right of decision is limited only to matters of common concern. Therefore,
a wife is entitled to hold property interests distinct from the control of her
husband: "[The husband's power] leaves the Wife in the full and free
possession of what by Contract is her peculiar Right .... [T]he Wife has,
201. Id. bk. II, § 52.
202. Id. bk. II, § 78.
203. Id. bk. II, § 81 (emphasis in original).
204. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 195, at 144 ("Though conjugal society among human
beings would be more persistent than among other species, this did not mean that marriage
would be indissoluble.").
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in many cases, a Liberty to separate from him . . "205 Indeed, Locke's
comments in his chapter on conquest indicate an even stronger assertion of
a woman's right to hold property: "For as to the Wife's share, whether
her own Labour or Compact gave her a Title to it, 'tis plain, Her Husband
could not forfeit what was hers.' '2 6
Having established the basis for both liberty and property rights in women,
Locke discusses what these rights involve. Since Locke never explicitly
discusses women in his description of the state of nature, the argument for
a right of abortion must assume that Locke's references to "man" and
"mankind" are generic terms which include both men and women. 207 Given
this assumption, the logical conclusion is that a woman has broad liberty
and property rights, including a "fundamental" right to privacy and control
of her own body:
[E]very Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any
Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his
Hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then he removes out
of the State that Nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed
his Labour with, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby
makes it his Property.-°
Indeed, "[tihe argument that a woman has a right to do with her body as
she wishes is then to be understood as a claim of an unlimited or absolute
right over herself, where no one else is affected."' 09 Joining a liberty interest
205. J. LOCKE, supra note 18, bk. II, § 82 (emphasis in original); see also Butler, supra
note 195, at 145 ("Locke distinguished between the property rights of husband and wife. All
property in conjugal society was not automatically the husband's. A wife could have property
rights not subject to her husband's control.").
206. J. LOCKE, supra note 18, bk. II, § 183; see also Butler, supra note 195, at 145 ("Locke's
patriarchy was limited, though. The husband's power of decision extended only to those
interests and properties held in common by husband and wife.").
207. See Butler, supra note 195, at 149 ("Locke believed that women shared the basic
freedom and equality characteristic of all members of the species. Women were capable of
rational thought; in addition, they could make contracts and acquire property. Thus it appeared
that women were capable of satisfying Locke's requirements for political life."). But see Clark,
Women and John Locke; or, Who Owns the Apples in the Garden of Eden?, 7 CAN. J. PHIL.
699, 718 (1977) ("[W]omen's rights are dependent on men's rights. They do not have
independent rights, and the reason for this is that they could not be regarded as independent
persons with full property rights if the exclusive right of the male to dispose of property is to
be maintained."); id. at 719 ("[Locke] leaves [women] in the family, born in the state of
nature and necessarily left unchanged in civil society .... [H]e clearly accepted the premise
that there is a natural inequality of the sexes and that the male is by nature superior."); W.
K NDALL, JoHN LOCKE AND THE DOCTRINE OF MAJORITY RutLE 121 (1959) ("[I]t seems highly
improbable that Locke was thinking in terms of extending those [equal] rights to women.").
208. J. LOCKE, supra note 18, bk. II, § 27 (emphasis in original); see e.g., J. TuLLY, supra
note 39, at 105 ("Man ... is said to be the proprietor of two items. He has a property in,
or is the proprietor of his person and, he is also the proprietor of the actions of his person.").
209. Glenn, supra note 63, at 75; see also C. MACPHERSON, THE PoLncAL THEORY OF
PossEssrvE INDIVIDUALIsM: HOBBES TO LOCKE 199 (1962) ("Locke's astonishing achievement
was to base the property right on natural right and natural law, and then to remove all the
natural law limits from the property right.").
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in her own person (which would also include her body) with the right to
property in the labor of her body (which presumably includes an unborn
fetus whose development and nourishment is a product of the labor of her
body), creates a possible justification for the right of a woman to decide
whether to abort a fetus.
This position can be strengthened if protecting the right of a woman to
decide whether to abort a fetus serves to foster the reflective deliberation
and self-direction essential to her rational liberty. The primary concern of
the rational liberty view is to promote that conduct which ."is part of
reflective self-direction and maintains the capacity for self-governance in
the actor and others. ' 21 0 Accordingly, the concept of rational liberty bears
a striking resemblance to Justice Blackmun's arguments that:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman
by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm
medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved. Mater-
nity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful
life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and
physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also the distress,
for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and there is the
problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically
and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this one, the additional
difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed motherhood may be in-
volved.2"
According to this view, refusing a woman the right to decide whether to
abort a fetus might greatly circumscribe her liberty interests in directing the
course of her life.
The argument for a broad right to abortion can be strengthened further
by arguing that Locke's views on the status of an unborn fetus are consistent
with Roe's conclusion that an unborn fetus is not a "person." According
to Locke, the development of deliberative capacities is the primary purpose
of rational liberty. Therefore, it is not surprising that Locke defines "per-
sonhood" as essentially the ability to think or reason.212 Accordingly, Locke
writes that:
[t]he Freedom then of Man and Liberty of acting according to his own
Will, is grounded on his having Reason, which is able to instruct him
210. R. SmrrH, supra note 10, at 226.
211. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
212. "[A person] is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can
consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places; which it does
only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me, essential
to it . . . ." J. LocK, supra note 32, bk. II, ch. 27, § 11 (footnotes omitted).
The reason for focusing on rationality as the criterion of personhood is that all natural
rights and duties flow from it. "Thus we are born Free as we are born Rational; not that we
have actually the Exercise of either: Age, that brings one, brings with it the other too." J.
LocKE, supra note 18, bk. II, § 61 (emphasis in original).
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in that Law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far
he is left to the freedom of his own will.2
13
Combined with Locke's various statements in the second treatise that
children do not have the ability to reason,214 this definition could mean that
an unborn fetus does not have the ability to reason and thus is not a
"person." This is borne out in his discussion of property, and in several
other instances, where Locke is careful to make a distinction between the
born and the unborn: "[N]atural Reason ... tells us, that Men, being once
born, have a right to their Preservation, and consequently to Meat and
Drink, and such other things, as Nature affords for their Subsistence
. . "215 Implicit in this statement is Locke's assumption that an unborn
fetus has no liberty or property rights (including preservation), and as such,
is merely the product of the labor of a Twoman's body and hence subject
to her control. This rejection of personhood in the unborn fetus, coupled
213. J. LOCKE, supra note 18, bk. II, § 63 (emphasis in original). Such a characterization
of Locke's view of personhood is consistent with modem critical interpretations of Locke's
thought. See, e.g., J. CoLmAN, supra note 28, at 188-89 ("It is, therefore, a consciousness of
free actions which properly constitutes the person.... In this sense the individual can be said
to be the Tauthor of himself and therefore to have a property in his person."); J. TuurY,
supra note 39, at 109 ("A child becomes a free man on attaining the age and use of reason,
and the free man becomes a free agent and a person in thinking and acting. The criterion of
personhood is the consciousness which always accompanies thought and action."); Behan,
Locke on Persons and Personal Identity, 9 CAN. J. Pun. 53, 61-62 (1979) ("Locke's idea of
moral man is the idea of a corporeal rational creature, a 'corporeal rational Being' . . . [who]
need satisfy only two criteria to be considered legally a person: the individual must possess
legal rights and must be the subject of legal duties."). But see C. MACPHERSON, supra note
209, at 232-38 (arguing that rationality for Locke was really the private appropriation of land
and the materials it yields).
Such a characterization of personhood is also consistent with modern philosophical views
on the subject. One commentator has noted that "the idea of a chooser, a decider, who has
full capacity for rational decision and choice, seems to be central to our idea of a holder of
rights." McCloskey, The Right to Life, 84 MiND 403, 413-14 (1975); see also id. at 414, 417;
Richards, The Individual, the Family, and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential Perspective, 55
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 9 (1980) (The development of a capacity for individual choice, the central
criterion for becoming a person, consists in "self-critically deciding, as a free and rational
being, which of one's first-order desires will be developed and which disowned, which capacities
cultivated and which left fallow, with what or with whom in one's life one will or will not
identify, and what goals to strive toward.").
Such an argument has been recognized by the Court within the abortion context. See, e.g.,
Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979) ("[Dluring the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to recognize and
avoid choices that could be detrimental to them." (citation omitted)).
214. J. LOCKE, supra note 18, bk. II, §§ 57-60; see J. Coi A., supra note 28, at 188
("Children below a certain age ... have not the use of reason and are, therefore, not free.
This means that they are not capable of a law and cannot be held responsible for their deeds.
Consequently, they do not count as persons in the forensic sense of that term." (footnote
omitted)); J. Tuny, supra note 39, at 106 ("Locke explains in the Two Treatises that to be
capable of law is to be able to use or to exercise one's own reason; this is the condition of
being free, or a free man. Children lack this ability and so are not free .... Children are
not, therefore, persons." (citations omitted)).
215. J. LOCKE, supra note 18, bk. II, § 27 (emphasis added).
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with no right to preservation until birth and Locke's argument that women
are free individuals entitled to liberty and property rights, suggest that
Locke's writings may support a broad and fundamental right to privacy in
abortion decisions, a right which lies at the heart of the Roe decision.
However, consideration of the countervailing societal interests implicated
by a broad and fundamental right to privacy in the abortion decision results
in a conclusion that the asserted privacy right is likely not fundamental.
First, the assertion that a woman's "privacy" rights include control over
the future of an unborn fetus is inconsistent with the Lockean liberal
tradition's fundamental premise concerning the origin of her liberty and
property rights. An individual's liberty and property rights arise not from
his relationship to his fellow man, but rather from his relationship to God,
author and creator of the world in which he finds property.2 6 "For Men
being all the Workmanship of one Omnipotent, and infinitely wise Maker;
All the Servants of one Sovereign Master, sent into the World by his order
and about his business, they are his Property, whose Workmanship they
are, made to last during his, not one anothers Pleasure. ' 21 7 Although an
individual has property in his person and all things with which he mixes
his labor, that property in the first instance belongs to God. This leads to
some remarkable consequences:
They who say the Father [and implicitly the Mother] gives Life to his
Children... do not, as they ought, remember God, who is the Author
and Giver of Life: 'Tis in him alone we live, move, and have our
Being ....
To give Life to that which has yet no being, is to frame and make a
living Creature, fashion the parts, and mould and suit them to their
uses, and having proportion'd and fitted them together, to put into
them a living Soul. He that could do this, might indeed have some
pretence to destroy his own Workmanship. But is there any one so bold,
that dares thus far Arrogate to himself the Incomprehensible Works of
the Almighty?21'8
216. See R. AsncArFT, supra note 33, at 85-86 ("[H]uman beings have a relationship to
property (the earth) that is conditional, not absolute, and those conditions must be defined in
terms of God's purposes in permitting the use of His property.").
217. J. LocKE, supra note 18, bk. II, § 6; see, e.g., J. TULLY, supra note 39, at 109 ("[A
man's] body and his limbs are God's property: the actions he uses them to make are his
own."); id. at 58-59 (arguing Locke saw God and not man as the creator of man so that no
man might have any absolute right over another); McCloskey, supra note 213, at 404 ("Locke
argued for the right to life on theistic grounds, namely, that we are God's property, that we
therefore lack the right to take life, our own or that of another person .... ").
218. J. LocK, supra note 18, bk. I, §§ 52-53 (emphasis in original); see also R. AsHcRar,
supra note 33, at 72 ("[Fathers neither give life to their children nor have they power to take
it away.... Locke's position is that no plausible reading of the purposes of the Law of
Nature can be invoked to justify the assertion of the unlimited power of fathers.").
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A woman's labor confers no additional rights over the product of her labor
other than the right not to have that product taken away.2 9 The mere fact
that it is the labor of a woman's body that supports the growth of the
fetus does not give her an unlimited or fundamental property right in it.
At most, her labor merely gives her the right not to have the fetus taken
away.220 Moreover, Locke's assertion that "[tlo give life to that which has
yet no being" recognizes that the life of the fetus does begin at the moment
of conception. Thus, although a woman may have certain liberty and
property rights, these rights do not extend over the life or death of her
children and do not, in fact, extend as far as an unborn fetus, whom God,
more than the parents, has created. 221
Second, Locke's description of "inalienable" rights also supports a more
limited interpretation of a woman's liberty and property rights. A Lockean
inalienable right cannot "be separated from one's person or nature."2
Implicit in the inalienable right to liberty is a distinction between freedom
and license: "Freedom does not include the right or the rightful power to
alienate inalienable rights .... Because the idea of inalienable rights nec-
essarily precludes my having 'absolute arbitrary power' over myself, neither
I nor anyone else may arbitrarily dispose of me as I or they wish."' 'm There
219. J. TULLY, supra note 39, at 121.
220. See Hafen, supra note 116, at 535 (arguing that it is "a complete perversion of the
liberty of parenthood to believe that a woman may terminate a pregnancy because of some
variation on the theme of a 'parental' right" on the grounds that if the fetus is "significant
enough to give rise to such a lofty claim, it is significant enough to bar an abortion as the
earliest form of child abuse.").
221. This argument has been accepted by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) ("Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But
it does not follow that they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their
children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make
that choice for themselves."); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 631 (1979) ("Notions of parental
authority and family autonomy cannot stand as absolute and invariable barriers to the assertion
of constitutional rights by children."); see also Byrn v. New York City Health and Hosps.
Corp., 31 N.Y.2d 194, 206, 286 N.E.2d 887, 892, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390, 397 (1972) (Burke, J.,
dissenting) ("Human beings are not merely creatures of the State, and by reason of that fact,
our laws should protect the unborn from those who would take his life for purposes of
comfort, convenience, property or peace of mind rather than sanction his demise.").
222. Glenn, supra note 63, at 66.
223. Id. at 73; see also J. TLLY, supra note 39, at 115 ("It does not follow ... that the
rightholder can consent to transfer something that is his own. His person, action, liberty and
life are his property, yet these inalienables cannot be taken with consent.").
Glenn then argues convincingly that such an approach to inalienable rights is the only one
that makes good' sense:
Locke thought that the chances for freedom were better if it were firmly
established that government may not justify killing or enslaving its citizens on
the ground that it did so with their consent. Locke is right if we admit that,
while both may be difficult, it is easier to determine whether a government kills
or enslaves its citizens than whether it does so with their consent.
Glenn, supra note 63, at 80; see also Byrn, 31 N.Y.2d at 207, 286 N.E.2d at 893, 335 N.Y.S.2d
at 398 (Burke, J., dissenting) (Arguing that the Declaration of Independence "restated the
natural law" and "was intended to serve as a perpetual reminder that rulers, legislators, and
Judges were without power to deprive human beings of their rights.").
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emerges from this distinction a conflict with the broad view of a woman's
liberty previously mentioned:
If one has such a right to consent to doing anything to oneself one
would then have a right to alienate his inalienable rights .... If one
has an unlimited right to do with one's body as one sees fit, then one
cannot at the same time also have inalienable rights which limit, as we
have shown., what one can do with it. Therefore the woman's right over
her own body argument denies the distinction between inalienable free-
dom and license by denying the ethical and logical assumption on which
it is based. That assumption is that we do not have the right to alienate
our inalienable rights.-
Quite apart from the societal interests in preserving the life of the unborn
fetus because it is a potential person, 22 the Lockean liberal tradition
significantly narrows the true nature of a woman's liberty interest in
controlling her body. Thus, it is highly likely that the Lockean liberal
tradition would not recognize a fundamental right to privacy in the abortion
decision because the unlimited claim of a woman to control her body "is
a claim to license but to a license which is so greatly expanded that it
abolishes inalienable freedom. '12 6
Even assuming that the woman's asserted privacy interest is fundamental,
there are compelling societial interests that justify state regulation of the
abortion decision. 227 First, there is the proscription under the Lockean liberal
tradition against killing except when absolutely necessary. Second, in con-
trast to Roe, Locke's idea of rational liberty compels the conclusion that
the notion of "personhood," that is, the ability to reason, does extend to
an unborn fetus who is endowed with the potential to reason. Finally,
similar to the Roe Court's assertion that the state does have an interest in
protecting the potentiality of human life, the Lockean liberal tradition
requires that each individual in a state of nature or civil society, especially
a parent, preserve mankind in general. This obligation must include an
unborn fetus, who, from the time of conception has the potential to live
and to reason. Although each interest standing alone is likely insufficient
to constitute a compelling state interest, when combined and analyzed as a
224. Glenn, supra note 63, at 75.
225. See infra notes 227-38 and accompanying text.
226. Glenn, supra note 63, at 75.
227. Roe differs significantly from Griswold in that Roe involves strong countervailing
interests in the preservation of the unborn fetus, while Griswold involves only the liberty
interests of married individuals. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Brown, 321 F. Supp. 741, 746 (N.D.
Ohio 1970) ("The difference between [an abortion] case and Griswold is clearly apparent, for
here there is an embryo or fetus incapable of protecting itself. There, the only lives were those
of two competent adults."); Byrn, 31 N.Y.2d at 209, 286 N.E.2d at 894, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 400
(1972) (Burke, J., dissenting) ("Here [in the abortion situation] there are three people with
different interests involved. The man, the woman and the foetus. The foetus has the superior
'right to life' rather than the particular female's or male's concern to avoid responsibility.").
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whole, these societal interests convincingly justify state regulation of the
abortion decision.
First, by grounding the ultimate foundation of property rights in God as
the creator and author of life, Locke must conclude that, as a general
proposition, one ought not to kill, since this constitutes a destruction of
God's property. This is true for animals and other creatures,2 8 as well as
for mankind in general: "Every one as he is bound to preserve himself,
and not to quit his Station wilfully; so by the like reason when his own
Preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as much as he can, to
preserve the rest of Mankind . .. ."229 From these considerations, Locke
concludes that each individual is under a duty to preserve mankind, as well
as a duty to respect what preserves life, liberty and property in another.20
The second societal interest is the value of children and unborn fetuses
as potential reasoning and deliberative members of society. As noted above,
Locke argues that a man has property in his own person. 231 Moreover, we
have seen that due to the Lockean liberal tradition's emphasis on the
development of an individual's deliberative capacities, Locke defines per-
sonhood as a consciousness that accompanies thought and action, essentially
the ability to reason .2 2 If one were to pursue a strict interpretation of the
Lockean liberal tradition, one might very well conclude that an unborn
fetus is not a person according to Locke's definition and hence is not
entitled to any protection under natural law. When one looks deeper into
Locke's views on the nature of children and the parent-child relationship,
as well as the full implications of the rational liberty view, however, a
different conclusion is reached.
228. J. LocKE, supra note 18, bk. I, §§ 39, 56, 92.
229. Id. bk. II, § 6 (emphasis in original); see also R. ASHCRAFr, supra note 33, at 101-02
("[T]here is a moral standard that God has given to individuals in their natural condition
prohibiting them from taking any action that would harm another individual. And, positively,
natural law obliges them to act in a manner that will preserve mankind in general." (emphasis
in original)).
230. See, e.g., J. Durr, supra note 28, at 107 (Men are proscribed from killing unless "it
serves some good purpose, both because the law of nature enjoins the preservation of all men
'as much as possible,' and also as an instance of the general prohibition on the waste of
natural resources." (footnote omitted)); W. KENI LL, supra note 207, at 79 ("It is a law of
nature which emphasizes the claims upon the individual of the broader interests of his fellow
men, living and unborn, and ... one which fixes attention upon the individual's duty to
satisfy those claims." (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted)); McCloskey, supra note 213,
at 408-09 ("Equally important is the claim that the natural law ethic establishes that it is
intrinsically and hence always wrong to take (innocent) life." (emphasis in original)); R.
AslicRAr, supra note 19, at 260 ("In the Two Treatises ... this owner/object relationship
functions as a prohibitive injunction against any humanly advanced claims to exercise a right
of destruction over God's 'property,' at least in the absence of any direct divine order to do
SO.").
231. J. LocKE, supra note 18, bk. II, § 27; see supra note 208 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text.
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Since Locke links natural rights to the individual's capacity for rational
deliberation and self-direction, Locke attributes natural rights to children,
and by extension fetuses, because each possesses the same potential to
develop into fully rational members of society. For a theorist who was
primarily concerned with the rights of individuals capable of deliberation
and rational self-direction, but who did not believe that young children
possess that ability, Locke spent an extraordinary amount of time discussing
the nature of children and their corresponding political and natural relations
to their parents. Given his belief that children do not possess these abilities, 23
the most startling of Locke's claims is that a child's worth is grounded not
in his bodily existence, but rather in his potential to reason:
The Power, then, that Parents have over their Children arises from that
Duty which is incumbent on them, to take care of their Off-spring,
during the imperfect state of Childhood. To inform the Mind, and
govern the Actions of their yet ignorant Nonage, till Reason shall take
its place ....
Thus, we are born Free, as we are born Rational; not that we have
actually the Exercise of either: Age that brings one, brings with it the
other too. 4
Therefore, under the Lockean liberal tradition, children possess a liberty
interest in their potential personhood: "Every Man is born with a double
Right: First, A Right of Freedom to his Person, which no other Man has
a Power over, but the free Disposal of it Lies in himself. Secondly, A
Right, before any other Man, to inherit, with his Brethren, his Fathers
233. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
234. J. Locxe, supra note 18, bk. II, §§ 58-61 (emphasis in original). Several commentators
have reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 195, at 146 ("No immature
child could be expected to take part in the social compact. Yet children's inability to participate
in politics would not preclude their right to consent to government when they reached
adulthood."); Richards, supra note 213, at 10 ("In fact, although people differ widely in their
actual exercise of autonomous capacities, the idea of human rights does not require actual
autonomy, but only the capacity for it.").
This conclusion has also been reached by at least one modern philosophical writer. See
McCloskey, supra note 213, at 415 ("Yet the pressure to attribute rights to infants is
considerable, and this is, I suggest, because of their potentiality. Indeed, many of their rights,
and the duties which spring from them, derive from their potentialities as free, rational,
creative beings ....").
The Supreme Court has implicitly recognized that it is the ability to reason that entitles a
minor to rights when the Court allowed a limited right of abortion without parental consent
in Bellotti. The Court stated that "if the minor satisfies a court that she has attained sufficient
maturity to make a fully informed decision, she then is entitled to make her abortion decision
independently." 443 U.S. at 650; see also Parham, 442 U.S. at 627 ("Constitutional rights do
not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined age of
majority."); Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248, 1253 (W.D.N.C. 1971) ("Whether
possessing a soul from the moment of conception or mere protoplasm, the fertilized egg is,
we think, 'unique as a physical entity,' ... with the potential to become a person." (citation
omitted) (emphasis added)).
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Goods. '235 Children thus have natural rights, including the right to nour-
ishment and education from their parents, because they have the potential
to mature and develop into fully rational members of civil society.
Under the Lockean liberal tradition, an unborn fetus has the same rights
as a child. Locke earlier asserted that a parent has no right to take the life
of his or her born children because God, not the parents, is the author and
giver of life. 23 6 As a result, Locke would reject any argument that parents
have a right to destroy an unborn fetus that is not yet physically viable.
His statement that it is God who "give[s] Life to that which has yet no
being" implicitly recognizes that life begins at conception. Because an
unborn fetus is "alive" just like a living child, it possesses the same potential
to reason as that living child. 237 Thus, unlike the Roe Court, which concluded
that an unborn fetus is not a person within the meaning of the fourteenth
amendment, Locke would find that because personhood actually consists in
the ability to deliberate and engage in rational self-direction, an unborn
fetus deserves protection as a "person" because it, like children already
born, possesses this potential and is thus a part of mankind. 3s
Since an unborn fetus is a person as that term would be applied to
children already born, it follows that an unborn fetus is entitled to the
same rights and protections that parents are obliged to provide for children
already born. As noted above, Locke places parents under a positive duty
to protect and provide for their offspring. 239 Under this theory of "liberal
paternalism," parents are not given absolute or wide-ranging power of
direction, but rather are required to exercise this authority solely to develop
the child's potential to become a free, rational "person.'"'2 Accordingly,
235. J. LocKE, supra note 18, bk. II, § 190 (emphasis in original).
236. See supra notes 216-21 and accompanying text.
237. This conclusion is also consistent with the views of another natural law theorist, St.
Thomas Aquinas: "[Tihe natural law position of Thomas [Aquinas] on abortion primarily
constitutes a refusal to discriminate among potential human beings on the basis of their varying
physical potentialities. Once conceived, the fetus is recognized as man because he has a man's
potential for rationality." Gerber, Abortion: Two Opposing Legal Philosophies, 15 AM. J.
Juxus. 1, 8 (1970); see also R. Smrrm, supra note 10, at 26 ("[fln the Second Treatise ... the
promotion of man's rational capacities is at the heart of [Locke's] views on political goals."
(emphasis added)).
238. As Gerber notes, "He [the fetus] is not 'inferior' any more than an infant in his
mother's arms or a child in grade school is inferior to adult humanity." Gerber, supra note
237, at 21.
239. See supra notes 39-43, 162-63 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court recognized
this argument when it claimed: "It is cardinal with us that custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
240. Richards, supra note 213, at 14-15; see also id. at 42 ("But the liberal paternalist
theory of parenthood, stated by Locke, requires that parents, as part of their basic moral
dties, prepare children for rational independence, including the capacity to evaluate critically,
as free and rational individuals, what life to lead." (citations omitted)).
This argument has been recognized by the Court: "This affirmative process of teaching,
guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is essential to the growth of young people into
mature, socially responsible citizens." Belotti, 443 U.S. at 638.
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an unborn fetus has the same rights to preservation, nourishment, and
rational education as an already born child.
The rational liberty view requires that society's primary duty be to protect
and foster the capacity for rational liberty of all persons.241 Because the
foregoing discussion has demonstrated that an unborn fetus is a potential
person (because it has the potential capacity for rational liberty), it follows
that it, too, is entitled to society's protection. Accordingly, there emerges
a societal interest sufficiently compelling to justify state regulation of a
woman's fundamental right to privacy regarding the abortion decision.
Protecting a woman's right to an abortion restricts and inhibits the potential
capacity for rational deliberation in an unborn fetus. The woman's funda-
mental interest in her own rational liberty (control of her own body) may
be restricted in order to foster the potential capacity of an unborn fetus
for rational liberty.
An analysis under the Lockean moral philosophy approach of the various
interests asserted in the Roe opinions produces a result wholly inconsistent
with that reached by the Supreme Court in Roe. The Lockean liberal
tradition does recognize a woman's potential fundamental right of privacy
in her own body and the corresponding decision of whether to have an
abortion. However, because that decision operates to inhibit the unborn
fetus' potential capacity to exercise rational liberty, society has a compelling
interest which justifies legislative regulation of a woman's privacy interests.
D. Bowers v. Hardwick
In Bowers42 the Supreme Court rejected an argument that the right of
privacy included the right of an individual to engage in consensual homo-
sexual sodomy.23 The Court's rejection of this right of privacy is indefensible
under a Lockean moral philosophy approach which, in fact, bears a striking
resemblance to the analysis and conclusions reached by Justices Blackmun
and Stevens, the dissenters in Bowers. Specifically, a reexamination of
Locke's views concerning personhood, the marriage relationship, and the
limited nature of the countervailing societal interests in this area parallel
the arguments advanced by Justices Blackmun and Stevens for a funda-
mental right to engage in consensual homosexual sodomy.
The state charged Hardwick with violating a Georgia sodomy statute
when the police discovered Hardwick having sexual relations with another
241. See R. SmrrH, supra note 10, at 217 ("[The rational liberty view] commissions us to
act so that we do not harm the capacities for rational understanding and self-control of
ourselves or others ....." (emphasis added)).
242. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
243. See id. at 190.
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adult male in the privacy of his own home.2 After the District Attorney
refused to pursue the matter, Hardwick brought suit in federal court to
challenge the constitutionality of the statute "insofar as it criminalized
consensual sodomy." 245 The district court granted the state's motion to
dismiss, but a divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit reversed, holding that "the Georgia statute violated [Hardwick's]
fundamental rights because his homosexual activity is a private and intimate
association that is beyond the reach of state regulation by reason of the
Ninth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 246 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict in the
circuits over this issue 47
Initially, Justice White's majority opinion rejected the argument that "the
Court's prior cases ... construed the Constitution to confer a right of
privacy that extend[ed] to homosexual sodomy and for all intents and
purposes ... decided this case." 24 White stated that none of the past
formulations for identifying fundamental rights would extend a fundamental
right to homosexual sodomy.249 He characterized this claim as "facetious"
because state statutes have historically forbidden sodomy, because "pros-
criptions against that conduct have ancient roots," and because sodomy has
consistently been a crime at common law. 250 White expressed hesitancy to
"expand the substantive reach of [the Due Process] Clauses, particularly if
it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundamental.' '"5
White also rejected an argument that the Court should reach a different
244. The Georgia statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984), defines the illegal conduct as
follows: "(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any
sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another ......
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.l.
245. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188.
246. Id. at 189.
247. Id. at 189 & n.3.
248. Id. at 190. Justice White argued that none of the rights announced in the earlier
privacy cases bore any resemblance to the asserted right of homosexuals to engage in consensual
sodomy. Because "[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand
and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated," White found unsupportable
"any claim that these cases nevertheless stand for the proposition that any kind of private
sexual conduct between consenting adults is constitutionally insulated from state proscription."
Id. at 191.
249. Justice White focused on two famous formulations: those which were "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty," and those liberties "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition." Id. at 191-92 (quoting Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 and Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.)).
250. Id. at 192-94.
251. Id. at 195. White gave two reasons for this hesitancy. First, he felt the Court "[was]
most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional
law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution." Id. at
194. Second, he felt that in attempting to discover such rights, "the Judiciary necessarily takes
to itself further authority to govern the country without express constitutional authority." Id.
at 195.
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result because "the homosexual conduct occurs in the privacy of the
home." 12 Finally, he rejected Hardwick's argument that "the presumed
belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy
is immoral and unacceptable" did not provide a rational basis for the
statute. 3
Two Justices filed dissenting opinions. These opinions are examined in
considerable detail because the proper Lockean analysis closely parallels the
analysis and conclusions reached by each. In the first, Justice Blackmun
argued that two distinct but closely related rationales protected Hardwick's
claim. First, Blackmun noted that the Court "has recognized a privacy
interest with reference to certain decisions that are properly for the individual
to make. ' ' 24 He pointed out:
The fact that individuals define themselves in a significant way through
their intimate sexual relationships with others suggests, in a Nation as
diverse as ours, that there may be many "right" ways of conducting
those relationships, and that much of the richness of a relationship will
come from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and nature
of these intensely personal bondsy 5
Second, Blackmun noted that the Court "has recognized a privacy interest
with reference to certain places without regard for the particular activities
252. Id. The Court rejected Hardwick's analogy to Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969),
which protected possessing and reading obscene materials within the privacy of the home
because that conduct was closely tied to the first amendment, while Hardwick's was not. White
also expressed concern over determining the scope of such a right to voluntary sexual conduct
between consenting adults because, "it would be difficult ... to limit the claimed right to
homosexual conduct while leaving exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual
crimes even though they are committed in the home." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195-96.
253. White responded: "The law, however, is constantly based on notions of morality, and
if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process
Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed." Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell concurred in the opinion of the Court. Justice
Burger wrote separately to underscore his belief "that in constitutional terms there is no such
thing as a fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy." Id. at 196 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). Burger's opinion made a brief survey of the "millenia of moral teaching" on the
subject. See id. at 196-97. Justice Powell wrote separately to emphasize his belief that because
the statute imposed a sentence of up to 20 years for a single act, the respondent might have
been protected by the eighth amendment. Admitting that the question was not properly before
the Court because respondent had not been tried, convicted, or sentenced, Powell nevertheless
noted that under Georgia law a single act of sodomy carried with it potential penalties
comparable to other "serious felonies" such as aggravated battery, first degree arson and
robbery. See id. at 197-98 (Powell, J., concurring).
254. Id. at 204 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Although Justice Blackmun
conceded that the privacy cases can be characterized by their connection to the family, he
argues that "[w]e protect those rights not because they contribute, in some direct and material
way, to the general public welfare, but because they form so central a part of an individual's
life." Id.
255. Id. at 205 (emphasis added). Thus, Blackmun concludes, "[W]hat the Court really has
refused to recognize is the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature
of their intimate associations with others." Id. at 206.
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in which the individuals who occupy them are engaged. ' ' 26 Finally, Black-
mun asserted that the majority's improper characterization of the liberty
interest at stake had caused it to give too little scrutiny to the interests
advanced by the state. 25 7
Dissenting on slightly different grounds, Justice Stevens placed special
emphasis on the fact that the statute "express[ed] the traditional view that
sodomy [was] an immoral kind of conduct regardless of the identity of the
persons who engage in it. "28 Accordingly, he felt the analysis should proceed
through consideration of two issues. The first issue was whether the state
could totally proscribe the described activity "by means of a neutral law
applying without exception to all persons subject to its jurisdiction." If
not, the second was whether the state could still defend the statute "by
announcing that it will only enforce the law against homosexuals."2 9
Answering the first issue in the negative, Stevens noted that "when individual
married couples are isolated from observation by others, the way in which
they voluntarily choose to conduct their intimate relations is a matter for
them-not the State-to decide. ' '260 Stevens also answered the second issue
256. Id. at 204 (emphasis in original). Blackmun pointed out that "Uj]ust as the right to
privacy is more than the mere aggregation of a number of entitlements to engage in specific
behavior, so too, protecting the physical integrity of the home is more than merely a means
of protecting specific activities that often take place there." Id. at 206. Blackmun rejected the
majority's reading of Stanley as "entirely unconvincing" because he sees that decision as
anchored in "the Fourth Amendment's special protection for the individual in his home." Id.
at 207. Thus, he concluded: "[T]he right of an individual to conduct intimate relationships in
the intimacy of his or her own home seems to me to be the heart of the Constitution's
protection of privacy." Id. at 208.
257. First, Blackmun rejected the State's interest in protecting the general public health and
welfare because nothing in the record indicated that the conduct proscribed by the statute was
"physically dangerous, either to the persons engaged in it or to others." Id. at 209.
Second, Blackmun rejected an argument that the condemnation of consensual sexual sodomy
by certain religious groups gave the legislature power to proscribe the conduct since "[tihe
legitimacy of secular legislation depends instead on whether the State can advance some
justification for its law beyond its conformity to religious doctrine." Id. at 211.
Finally, Blackmun rejected any argument that the statute was a morally neutral exercise of
legislative power to protect the public environment: Consensual homosexual sodomy was
protected because it did not involve interference with "the rights of others, for the mere
knowledge that other individuals do not adhere to one's value system cannot be a legally
cognizable interest ... let alone an interest that can justify invading the houses, hearts, and
minds of citizens who choose to live their lives differently." Id. at 213 (citation omitted).
258. Id. at 216 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 217-18. Stevens argued that this conclusion followed from two principles that
had been clearly established by prior privacy cases. First, "the fact that the governing majority
in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason
for upholding a law prohibiting the practice." Id. at 216. Second, "individual decisons by
married persons [or unmarried individuals], concerning the intimacies of their physical rela-
tionship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of 'liberty' protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. Thus, Stevens concludes that a
total prohibition will not stand because "[tihe essential 'liberty' that animated the development
of the law in cases like Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Carey surely embraces the right to engage
in nonreproductive, sexual conduct that others may consider offensive or immoral." Id. at
218.
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in the negative because the state failed to show that homosexuals lacked
the same interest in liberty that others have,2' and because the state could
not provide a reason for applying a generally applicable law to certain
persons and not others.262
The Court's decision in Bowers identifies two "natural rights" issues that
underlie the alleged right of consensual homosexual sodomy and which lend
themselves to analysis under the Lockean moral philosophy approach. First,
the Court rejected an argument for a fundamental right to engage in
consensual homosexual sodomy that hinged on "the freedom an individual
has to choose the form and nature of [his] intensely personal bonds." 263
Second, the Court found that the governmental interest in promoting
morality was strong enough to justify a total ban on consensual homosexual
sodomy, an affirmation of the principle that the government should have
a broad role in regulating certain forms of intimate relationships.
The first step in the Lockean moral philosophy approach is to identify
the true nature of the privacy interest asserted. This privacy interest emerges
from Locke's idea of personhood and his discussion of the marriage
relationship. As noted above, Locke articulates a rational liberty view of
personhood that stresses individual worth in terms of rational and free
deliberation and self-direction: 264
The Freedom then of Man and Liberty of acting according to his own
Will, is grounded on his having Reason, which is able to instruct him
in that Law he is to govern himself by, and make him know how far
he is left to the freedom of his own will.-
Viewing personhood in this light means that, under the Lockean liberal
tradition, the types of rights protected as fundamental in the privacy area
will be those which enable the individual to foster his or her own self-
definition and identity. 2"
261. Noting that the principle that "all men are created equal" means at least "that every
free citizen has the same interest in 'liberty' that the members of the majority share," Stevens
concluded:
From the standpoint of the individual, the homosexual and the heterosexual have
the same interest in deciding how he will live his own life, and, more narrowly,
how he will conduct himself in his personal and voluntary associations with his
companions. State intrusion into the private conduct of either is equally burden-
some.
Id. at 218-19.
262. Stevens noted that the tate had not supported its "policy of selective application ...
by a neutral and legitimate interest-something more substantial than a habitual dislike for,
or ignorance about, the disfavored group." Id. at 219.
263. Id. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
264. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
265. J. LocKc, supra note 18, bk. II, § 63 (emphasis in original).
266. The rational liberty approach to self-definition has been identified in many of the
Court's decisions. Recently, the Court wrote that it is "the ability independently to define
one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
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Merging the importance of individual decisionmaking with Locke's view
of the marriage relationship produces a particularly strong argument in
favor of freedom to choose the nature of one's own intimate sexual
relationships. Although Locke took special pains to ensure a right of privacy
within the marriage relationship as a whole, closer examination of his
thought reveals that he did so in order to ensure that the marriage rela-
tionship was first and foremost a relationship involving the intimacies of
two distinct individuals. Describing marriage as "a voluntary Compact
between Man and Woman[,] ' 217 Locke further delineated its individualistic
nature by arguing that its terms are somewhat negotiable, that the husband's
authority is limited solely to matters of common concern, and that when
children no longer need support, it can be terminated by divorce.268 Thus,
for Locke, the marriage relationship is a vehicle that aids each individual
in fully defining his or her personhood through rational deliberation and
virtually unrestricted selection of the way in which he or she orders intimate
personal relationships. 26 9
There emerges, then, from the Lockean liberal tradition a strong case in
support of a "fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the
nature of their intimate associations with others, ' 270 including relationships
involving consensual homosexual sodomy. This characterization of the true
nature of the liberty interest asserted in Bowers is evident in several of the
U.S. 609, 619 (1984). As a logical corollary to this, the Court recognized that "because the
Bill of Rights is designed to secure individual liberty, it must afford the formation and
preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary
from unjustified interference by the State." Id. at 618; see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589,
599-600 (1977) (recognizing the individual "interest in independence in making certain kinds
of important decisions"); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) ("Under our Constitution,
the freedom to marry, or not marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and
cannot be infringed by the State.").
267. J. LocKF, supra note 18, bk. II, § 78; see supra note 157 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
269. The Court has taken a very similar view of the marriage relationship in Eisenstadt,
405 U.S. at 438:
Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its
own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
.emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child.
Id. at 453 (emphasis in original). Implicit in such a statement is a recognition that the marriage
relationship is merely one means of ordering intimate "matters ... affecting a person." See
also Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 844 (1977) ("Thus the importance
of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from the role
it plays in 'promot[ifig] a way of life .... .' (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
231-33 (1972))); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) ("This Court
has long recognized that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is
one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
270. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 206 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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dissenting Justices' statements. First, Justice Blackmun noted that "indivi-
duals define themselves in a significant way through their intimate sexual
relationships with others." 271 Accordingly, he concluded that the Court has
protected as fundamental decisions regarding marriage and procreation not
because they protect the family and contribute to the general welfare, but
rather "because they form so central a part of an individual's life. '272
Similarly, Justice Stevens stated that "the homosexual and the heterosexual
have the same interest in deciding how he will live his own life, and, more
narrowly, how he will conduct himself in his personal and voluntary
associations with his companions."2 73 These statements are essentially iden-
tical to Locke's view of personal liberty: A man has "a Liberty to dispose,
and order, as he lists, his Person, Actions, Possessions, and his whole
Property, within the Allowance of those Laws under which he is; and
therein not to be subject to the arbitrary Will of another, but freely follow
his own.1 274
Analysis of the societal interests implicated by consensual homosexual
relationships under the Lockean liberal tradition leads to conclusions incon-
sistent with those reached by the Bowers majority. As noted in the earlier
discussion of the Griswold decision, societal regulation of decisions regarding
the course of intimate personal relationships could be sustained only if the
capacities for rational deliberation and self-direction in others would be too
greatly endangered by that course of action.27 Because consensual homo-
sexual relationships do not restrict the rational liberties of others, the state's
interest is minimal and the conduct is protected. Accordingly, one reaches
a situation almost identical to that in Griswold, where the societal interests
actually support, rather than limit, the privacy right asserted.
Allowing an individual freedom in choosing the nature of his or her
intimate associations with others substantially furthers societal interests in
fully developing an individual's capacity for rational deliberation and self-
direction. The Lockean rational liberty view would not permit governmental
regulation of an individual's freedom of decisionmaking in order to enforce
any sort of morality such as "conformity to religious doctrine":
[S]ince the nature and degree of individual talents and inclinations along
these lines vary, many different sorts of pursuits of happiness are still
appropriate. In fact, the goal of promoting rational liberty not only
permits but encourages considerable diversity in ways of life, even as it
indicates how a secure and noncompetitive sense of self-worth can be
271. Id. at 205.
272. Id. at 204. Further characterizing the nature of these past decisions, Blackmun noted
that the Court "has recognized a privacy interest with reference to certain decisions that are
properly for the individual to make." Id. (emphasis in original).
273. Id. at 218-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
274. J. LocKE, supra note 18, bk. II, § 57 (emphasis in original).
275. See supra notes 168-73 and accompanying text.
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obtained by all. The standard itself implies that all people should not
make the cultivation of their rational capacities their single goal, for
most persons are sufficiently multifaceted to find such a course so
narrow and frustrating as to be self-defeating. Furthermore, differences
in individual abilities, temperaments, and tastes mean that people will,
on reflection, make different choices about the activities that are most
likely to lead them to satisfactions consistent with continued self-direc-
tion. The rational liberty position therefore does not justify any public
effort to transform or "educate" persons according to some single
standard of proper human consciousness. For the most part, it encour-
ages people to be themselves. 276
Instead, the Lockean liberal tradition posits that moral regulation of indi-
vidual decisionmaking is a consequence of the law of nature that each
individual knows by reason; it is not a function of the legislative power in
civil society. Hence, a legislative prohibition of consensual homosexual
relationships based upon "the presumed belief of a majority of the electorate
in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable ' ' 27 fails
for overbreadth because it interferes with society's deeper interest in pro-
tecting how an individual "will conduct himself in his personal and voluntary
associations with his companions." 278
Analysis under the Lockean moral philosophy approach of the various
interests asserted in the Bowers opinions produces a result that is wholly
inconsistent with the Bowers decision. The Lockean liberal tradition rec-
ognizes a broad and fundamental right of privacy inherent in intimate
relationships and "the freedom an individual has to choose the form and
nature of these intensely personal bonds.''279 Moreover, although the Lock-
ean liberal tradition might allow the legislative authority to proscribe public
acts of consensual homosexuality in order to protect the public good, it
would find, as did the dissenters in Bowers, that legislation regulating
private sexual conduct wrongfully interferes with the liberties of rational
"persons" and is contrary to the best interests of society.
CONCLUSION
Contrary to Justice White's misgivings in Bowers v. Hardwick,280 the
Supreme Court can continue to legitimately engage in substantive due process
analysis in the right to privacy cases, provided it follows a Lockean moral
philosophy approach to discovering individual privacy rights. This Lockean
approach is appropriate for several reasons. In the first place, Lockean
276. R. Smrr, supra note 10, at 200-01.
277. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
278. Id. at 218-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 205 (emphasis in original).
280. 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see supra text accompanying note 1.
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moral philosophy is consistent with the values and principles that underlie
American constitutional law and form the basis of the American political
regime?8' Moreover, Lockean principles provided the basic approach for
the Court's first major utilization of substantive due process analysis during
the Lochner era.
In addition, reliance on Lockean principles provides a more consistent,
predictible and principled theoretical basis for modern substantive due
process analysis without granting to the Court any authority that it does
not already exercise. Because this approach to interpreting the fourteenth
amendment "would direct attention to the sorts of concerns to secure basic
freedoms that provided the amendment's chief historical impetus," it pro-
vides "a more detailed and appropriate theory of the basic liberties that
can be protected under [substantive] due process. ' 2 2 In other words, it
gives definite content to the interests protected by the due process clause
while at the same time directing decisionmakers, be they judges, legislators
or ordinary citizens, to the proper philosophical questions.
Adherence to the Lockean liberal tradition thus requires courts first to
determine whether the asserted privacy right is fundamental-whether it
truly fosters the individual's capacity for rational deliberation and self-
direction. If the right is deemed fundamental, then the state regulation will
be permitted only if it serves a compelling societal interest-that the exercise
of that right will inhibit the capacity for rational liberty in others. This
emphasis on society's duty to protect and foster the rational liberty of the
individual will still ensure significant protection of minority interests because
a civil society can only prohibit conduct wholly incompatible with the
rational deliberation and self-direction of all.283
Rethinking Griswold v. Connecticut,28 Roe v. Wade s5 and Bowers v.
Hardwickn6 in light of these principles demonstrates that a Lockean moral
philosophy approach to substantive due process analysis provides a highly
organized and equitable method for resolving issues raised by the modern
privacy cases. It supports the Court's result in Griswold because the interest
of married individuals in practicing contraception in the marital relationship
is consistent with the broader interests of civil society in promoting freedom
281. "Locke ... remains the most exemplary liberal theorist precisely because-as the
founding generation recognized-he reveals most powerfully the fundamental ends that early
liberalism proposed for political life and that America's constitutionalists promoted." R.
SrTa, supra note 10, at 16; see also id. at 13 ("THE WRITINGS of John Locke, taken as
a whole, remain the best examples of the Enlightenment liberalism that most heavily shaped
the framing of the American Constitution.").
282. Id. at 239.
283. Id. at 238.
284. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
285. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
286. 478 U.S. at 186.
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of decision regarding intimate aspects of an individual's relationships.
However, it rejects the Roe Court's assertion that the state cannot deny a
woman's fundamental right to privacy in decisions regarding abortion. This
right may be regulated because the state has a sufficiently compelling interest
in protecting and fostering the potential of the unborn fetus to become a
mature, rational individual. Similarly, it rejects the Court's decision in
Bowers because that case presents issues almost identical to those in Gris-
wold. The interests of the individual to engage in private, consensual
homosexual sodomy are again consistent with civil society's deeper interest
in promoting privacy and freedom in decisions regarding intimate personal
relationships. 217
Since our constitutional heritage is one whose foundation rests ultimately
upon the Lockean liberal tradition, any attempt by the Court to substantively
discern the scope and content of an individual's due process liberty interests
must be consistent with these principles. One possible standard was articu-
lated by Justice Harlan, who wrote: "Due process .. .. has represented
the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the
liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands
of organized society .... having regard to what history teaches are the
traditions from which it developed ..". ."28 Because the Lockean liberal
tradition, which emphasizes protection of the rational capacities of the
individual, is a tradition from which our country has developed and because
it strikes an appropriate balance between the liberty interests of individuals
and the demands of society, it provides a proper benchmark for thinking
through and resolving the issues raised by the modern privacy cases.
287. The conclusion here is only that a civil society which in large part traces its philosophical
roots to, and draws its legal principles from, the Lockean liberal tradition may not proscribe
by positive law the practice of consensual homosexual sodomy. This Note does not suggest in
any way that consensual homosexual relationships are morally "right" as a matter of natural
or divine law.
288. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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